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A BIRD IN THE HAND: SHOTGUNS, DEADLY OIL PITS, CUTE
KITTENS, AND THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
Samuel J. Panarella*
The defining characteristic shared by all migratory birds is found in
the category name—migration.1 More than half of the 650 species of
North American breeding birds migrate.2 Similar to migrations
undertaken by other animals—including humans—bird migrations are
often fraught with peril, and depending on the species of migratory bird
can be hundreds or even thousands of miles long and take weeks or
months to complete.3 Fortunately, most migrating birds make the journey
safely. Those lucky ducks (and other birds) are not the subject of this
Article. Rather, the focus here will be on the unfortunate birds that never
arrive at their intended migratory destination, as well as those killed
between migrations. Specifically, this Article will explore the question of
what, if any, legal consequences should attach under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (the “MBTA” or the “Act”)4 when a bird protected under the
Act is killed, intentionally or unintentionally, by anthropogenic activities.
More than just an interesting historical artifact, the original motivation
behind the passage of the MBTA—to protect migratory birds from
anthropogenic harm—is relevant today. Courts struggle to define what
limits, if any, should be placed on its application to activities that, unlike
hunting and poaching, are in no part motivated by intent to kill or injure
*

Associate Professor of Law, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana.
Thank you to my colleagues and my family for their assistance and critical reviews of this paper.
Any errors, omissions, or failures of execution are solely my own.
1 Animal migration is defined as “mov[ing] from one area to another at different times of the
year.”
Migrate,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY
(2016),
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/migrate.
2 See The Basics Of Bird Migration: How, Why, And Where, THE CORNELL LAB OF
ORNITHOLOGY (Jan. 1, 2007), https://www.allaboutbirds.org/the-basics-how-why-and-where-ofbird-migration/.
3 The dangers attendant in migrations are particularly and heartbreakingly relevant at the time
of this writing as many thousands of refugees from the Syrian civil war have died trying to flee to
safer places. See, e.g., Jim Yardley & Gaia Pianigiani, Three Days, 700 Deaths on Mediterranean
as Migrant Crisis Flares, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
05/30/world/europe/migrants-deaths-mediterranean-libya-italy.html (recounting how at least 700
refugees trying to reach Europe from Syria and parts of Africa drowned in three separate shipwrecks
over three days).
4 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Pub. L. No. 65-186, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2012)). The MBTA is the oldest U.S. federal law protecting birds. See
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, DIGEST OF FEDERAL RESOURCE LAWS OF INTEREST TO THE
U.S.
FISH
AND
WILDLIFE
SERVICE,
U.S.
FISH
&
WILDLIFE
SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/migtrea.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
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migratory birds but nevertheless do. The MBTA is administered by the
U.S. Department of Interior (“Department of Interior”) through the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”).5 The Act’s encompassing
“take” language and facial strict liability standard appear to reflect a
strong congressional intent to offer protection to listed birds from
multifarious causes and actors, without special regard to the societal or
commercial utility of the underlying activity. Add to that Congress’s
refusal over the last one hundred years to alter the Act’s broad
misdemeanor strict liability reach, even as it limited felony liability by
requiring scienter, and an otherwise sober-minded person could be
forgiven for concluding that the most legally prudent course of action is
to never leave home lest she accidentally injure a bird in her travels and
face criminal sanctions under the MBTA. Fortunately, common sense,
compelling legislative history, case law, and a history of the judicious
exercise of prosecutorial discretion all argue against this extreme reaction
to the Act. But it would be equal folly to assume that as long as one does
not engage in the hunting or poaching of birds there is nothing to fear
from the MBTA. Put another way, it is equally incorrect to say that the
MBTA only applies to hunting and poaching activities as it is to say the
Act applies to every anthropogenic harm that could befall a bird. The
former is too limited a view and misses the more generalized
conservational intent behind the Act. The latter is so broad that, if applied,
it would criminalize many otherwise lawful and societally and
economically-necessary commercial uses of the land, such as farming and
construction, as well as many nonindustrial but no less valued activities,
such as driving a car or sharing one’s house and yard with a pet cat—a
result Congress simply could not have intended when it passed the Act.
Where then is the Goldilocks-ian middle of MBTA liability that does
not criminalize every activity that might result in harm to a bird, but also
imposes legal consequences for anthropogenic harms to bird species of
the kind that motivated Congress to pass the Act? This question has
bedeviled federal courts in the United States and is the subject of a
longstanding and intense dispute between bird advocacy groups and
businesses whose industrial activities regularly, albeit incidentally, kill
migratory birds. And, this question recently made headlines across the
country again when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its decision in
United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,6 reversed Citgo’s MBTA
criminal misdemeanor conviction for migratory bird deaths caused by
birds landing in oil and wastewater pits at a refinery the company operates
in Texas. The district court found that Citgo’s oil field operations were a
5
6

16 U.S.C. § 701.
United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Citgo Petroleum”).

2017]

A Bird in the Hand

155

proximate cause of the bird deaths because these deaths were a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of Citgo using open-air oil and wastewater pits,
and, therefore, that Citgo was criminally liable for a “take” under the
MBTA.7 In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that criminal
liability for a taking under the MBTA is limited to situations where the
alleged violator took actions directed at migratory birds, which Citgo,
simply by operating the pits in furtherance of its refining operations, had
not done.8
The Fifth Circuit’s Citgo Petroleum opinion widened an existing split
among United States federal circuit courts on the question of whether
criminal liability under the MBTA should extend beyond affirmative acts
directed against migratory birds (e.g., hunting and poaching) to reach acts
that are not directed at birds but nevertheless result in the death of a
protected bird.9 It is well established under the law that activities in the
former category violate the MBTA and subject the actor to criminal
liability under the Act.10 The question that remains unresolved is whether
incidental bird deaths caused by the remarkably wide range of activities
making up the latter category (from industrial activities such as utilizing
open-air oil and wastewater pits in oil and gas operations and operating
electricity production facilities to typically nonindustrial activities such
as driving a car, letting a housecat roam freely outside, and living in a
dwelling with windows) should result in criminal liability under the Act.
7 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d, 801
F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015). The same year a federal district court in North Dakota, faced with
strikingly similar facts, came to the opposite conclusion, holding that no criminal liability should
attach under the MBTA for bird deaths caused by landing in defendant oil and gas producer’s
wastewater reserve pits, because the defendant’s use of the reserve pits was not intended to kill
birds. United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1212–13 (D.N.D. 2012)
(“[T]he use of reserve pits in commercial oil development is legal, commercially-useful activity
that stands outside the reach of the federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act.”).
8 Citgo Petroleum, 801 F.3d at 494.
9 See 16 U.S.C. § 707 (2012). Section 707(a), the misdemeanor penalty provision of the MBTA,
provides for punishment of up to a $15,000 fine and/or up to six months in prison for any violation
of the Act. The MBTA’s felony penalty provision, § 707(b), concerns knowingly taking a listed
migratory bird for the purpose of selling it. Because this Article does not address collecting and
selling migratory birds, § 707(a)’s misdemeanor liability will be the focus of this article’s liability
discussion.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 2002) (hunter who exceeded
his daily bag limit of ducks violated the MBTA); Rice Farmer Convicted and Fined for Poisoning
Birds, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, S. DIST. OF TEX. (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/rice-farmer-convicted-and-fined-poisoning-birds
(rice
farmer pleads guilty to MBTA criminal violation for intentionally poisoning 69 protected birds to
keep them from eating his crop); Parma Farmer Convicted of Conspiracy to Bait Ducks and
Placing Bait for Ducks, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DIST. OF IDAHO (May 17,
2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-id/pr/parma-farmer-convicted-conspiracy-bait-ducks-andplacing-bait-ducks (farmer convicted under MBTA for baiting farm to allow hunters to shoot
migratory birds attracted by bait).
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This article traces the often byzantine reasoning underlying this circuit
split and offers a practical solution to resolve it by using a category-based
approach to criminal liability under the MBTA.
This Article is presented in three parts. Part I describes the modern
application (and misapplication) of the MBTA and briefly sets out the
history of the Act, including the widespread, indiscriminate killing of
migratory birds for food and fashion in the 19th century that first spurred
Congress to act. Building off this history and the clear Congressional
intent behind the MBTA to criminalize industrial activities directed at
killing birds, Part II sorts human-caused bird killing activities into three
categories and proposes the appropriate MBTA liability treatment for
each category based both on the original purpose of the Act and on our
modern understanding of the desirability of balancing critical animal
species preservation against necessary industrial activity. This Article
concludes in Part III with a summary of the proposed approaches to the
current MBTA liability quagmire.

I. THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT.................................... 157
A. A Law out of Time? ..................................................... 157
B. Impetus for the Act ...................................................... 159
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When you have shot one bird flying you have shot all birds flying.
They are all different and they fly in different ways but the
sensation is the same and the last one is as good as the first.11

I. THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT
A. A Law out of Time?
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”),12 the United States’
best known, oft-copied, and most heavily litigated animal-protection law,
has entered a comfortable, albeit still controversial, middle age. The
ESA’s animating purpose (“to protect and recover threatened and
endangered species and the ecosystems upon which they depend”)13 and
strictures, while certainly not universally admired by all, are nevertheless
relatively well understood by its regulated community. Principal among
these strictures is that the incidental taking14 of an ESA listed species
without an Incidental Take Permit violates the ESA and subjects the
“takee” to potential civil and criminal liability.15 Compare the MBTA, a
far older animal protection law, that even in its dotage at one hundred
years old, remains subject to significant controversy about when and to
what actions it should apply. At first blush, a plain reading of the MBTA
and its implementing regulations appear to provide the same clarity
offered by ESA’s take provision—the taking of a listed migratory bird
for any reason and regardless of intention results in potential criminal
liability.16 And for intended takes, such as a hunter intentionally shooting
a protected migratory bird out of season, the application of the statute is
as straightforward as its wording.17 It is where the take of a protected bird
ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE SNOWS OF KILIMANJARO AND OTHER STORIES 63 (1961).
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 136 (2000) and 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2000)).
13 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
14 Similar to the take definition under the MBTA, a “take” occurs under the ESA when a listed
species is harassed, harmed, pursued, hunted, shot, killed, wounded, trapped, captured or collected,
or by any attempt to engage in such conduct. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
15 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). Unlike the ESA, the MBTA does not in most circumstances allow a
party with foreknowledge that its activities may incidentally result in the take of a covered species
to apply for an Incidental Take Permit to obviate liability for the incidental take under the Act. The
Service may issue take permits under the MBTA for certain intentional activities that result in the
death of a protected bird, such as scientific collecting, educational purposes, taxidermy and
falconry. See U.S FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 724 FW 1, AUTHORITIES, OBJECTIVES, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MIGRATORY BIRD PERMITS (2003).
16 16 U.S.C. § 707(a).
17 See, e.g., Hunting Guides Sentenced for Violating Migratory Bird Act in Reno County, DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DIST. OF KAN. (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ks/pr/hunting-guides-sentenced-violating-migratory-bird-act-renocounty (announcing the sentencing of two Kansas hunting guides for violating the MBTA by
exceeding the daily bag limits of Canada geese and mourning doves).
11
12
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was not intended, but rather the incidental result of an otherwise lawful
activity that the formerly clear waters become muddy, verging on opaque.
Despite being one of the oldest U.S. laws protecting wildlife, the
MBTA remains relatively obscure. Outside of a small community of bird
advocacy groups, hunters, owners of industrial operations that threaten
migratory birds—and, yes, some lawyers and law professors—the Act’s
primary prohibition against the intended killing of migratory birds has
little purchase on the popular imagination. In fact, beyond this small
community, to the extent the MBTA is known at all, it is for criminalizing
acts that almost certainly were not the intended target by the Act’s
original drafters. To wit, if you ask random people on the street what they
know about the MBTA, eventually you would likely find someone who
is aware of the law, and that person’s response would likely be something
along the lines of, “Isn’t that the law that makes it a federal crime for your
cat to kill a bird?” If you asked this same hypothetical well-informed
person what she knows about the ESA, a federal law with a strong
foothold in the popular imagination, she would likely tell you that it is the
federal law that makes it a crime to harm or kill endangered species
without a permit. Both of these responses are factually correct (if
incomplete), but only the Endangered Species Act response describes a
prohibition that was fundamental to the original purpose of the Act when
it was passed, and remains foundational today. The MBTA response, on
the other hand, describes a technical violation that even the original
drafters of the Act would likely have disagreed with and that has little to
no relevance to how the MBTA is enforced on the ground today.
The Endangered Species Act became law in 1973 as part of a tidal
wave of federal environmental and animal welfare legislation passed in
response to the burgeoning environmental movement of the early 1970s.18
Much has changed in the country in the intervening forty years since its
passage and the ESA has been amended several times in response, which
has kept it a thoroughly modern law.19 Compare the MBTA, which came
into existence at a time in America when our current conceptions about
the need to balance peoples’ desires for the nutritional bounty and
sartorial possibilities available from harvesting wild animals with the
18 Other major environmental legislation passed by Congress during this period includes the
National Environmental Policy Act in 1970 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–370h), the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (the “Clean Water Act”) in 1972 (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–387), and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act in 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 6901–992k).
19 For example, the 1982 amendments to the Endangered Species Act authorized the Service to
issue permits for the “incidental take” of listed species from otherwise legal activities and
introduced the requirement that applicants for incidental take permits prepare Habitat Conservation
Plans that minimize and mitigate harm to the impacted species during the proposed project. 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2).
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value (both psychic and tangible) of preserving these animals at
sustainable populations were just beginning to take shape. Indeed many
of the primary threats to birds in the 21st century were unknown in 1918
when the Act came into being. For instance, today communication towers
are responsible for several million bird deaths every year and many
thousands of birds die annually from colliding with commercial wind
turbines, but neither of these man-made structures existed in 1918.20 Like
the ESA, the MBTA has been amended several times over its lifetime,
but unlike the amendments to the ESA, these amendments have done little
to clarify the MBTA’s reach or applicability in the modern world, making
it “a law out of time.”
B. Impetus for the Act
At the close of the 19th century, America was an industrialized country
whose citizens seemed determined to bring under their dominion every
square inch of the nation’s remaining wild lands, and to put into their
stomachs or onto their bodies the wild animals that lived on those lands.
The United States was settled from coast-to-coast, with a transcontinental
railroad that made it possible to traverse the country at speeds
unimaginable only a few decades earlier, and held an exalted status as the
world’s manufacturing powerhouse.21 Oil wells were being sunk at a
furious pace in newly-discovered oil fields in several states, and John D.
Rockefeller’s now-infamous monopolistic monolith, Standard Oil,
controlled 90 percent of the oil refined in the United States.22 The United
States entered the new millennium with a booming economy, a
conviction bordering on arrogance in its own exceptionalism, and a future
that appeared unimaginably bright.
Of course, there was another, much darker, side to this triumphant
narrative. The U.S. Calvary’s massacre of hundreds of members of the
20 See Andrew W. Minikowski, A Vision or a Waking Dream: Revising the Migratory Bird Act
to Empower Citizens and Address Modern Threats to Avian Populations, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 152,
156–57 (2014) (“The modern threats facing migratory bird species could not have possibly been
contemplated by Congress when MBTA was passed in 1918, due to the extreme advances in
technological and industrial development that have since occurred. The statute needs to be
reexamined in the context of these modern threats in order to prevent it from becoming a mere
nullity or legislative antique.”).
21 See GARY M. WALTON & HUGH ROCKOFF, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 299
(11th ed. 2010) (“American gains in manufacturing output were . . . phenomenal relative to the rest
of the world. In the mid-1890s, the United States became the leading industrial power, and by 1910,
its factories poured forth goods of nearly twice the value of those of its nearest rival, Germany. In
1913, the United States accounted for more than one-third of the world’s industrial production.”).
22 See Rockefeller and the Standard Oil Monopoly, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUND.,
http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-16-2-b-rockefeller-and-the-standard-oilmonopoly.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
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Lakota Sioux tribe on the banks of Wounded Knee Creek in South Dakota
effectively ended the co-called Indian Wars that had raged across the
country for the better part of the 18th and 19th centuries.23 By 1900, the
Native American tribes that had survived the disease and brutalities
visited on them during these battles had been shunted off to live on newlycreated reservations, most of which were located in some of the country’s
most inhospitable and least fecund lands.24
Many of the animals that the Indian tribes had once relied on for their
survival fared no better. By the turn of the century, the American bison
was on the brink of extinction.25 This is remarkable considering that in
1860, only four decades earlier, the bison’s overwhelming presence on
America’s Great Plains caused one observer to note: “What strikes the
stranger with most amazement is their immense numbers. I know a
million is a great many, but I am confident we saw that number yesterday.
Certainly, all we saw could not have stood on ten square miles of ground.
Often, the country for miles on either hand seemed quite black with
them.”26 By the 1870s, commercial bison hunters were slaughtering the
animals at a remarkable rate, sending hundreds of thousands of bison
hides to the markets in the eastern United States each year.27 During the
1872–1873 commercial hunting season alone, over 1.5 million bison
hides were sent to market.28 The killing wasn’t limited to the commercial
hunters. Passengers on the new transcontinental railroads were
encouraged to shoot bison from the windows of their coaches, leaving the

23 See ROBERT M. UTLEY & WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, INDIAN WARS 300 (2002) (asserting that
the massacre at Wounded Knee “rang down the curtain” on the Indian Wars).
24 Id. at 290.
25 Shepard Krech III, Buffalo Tales: The Near-Extermination of the American Bison, NAT’L
HUMANITIES
CTR.,
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/nattrans/ntecoindian/essays/buffaloc.htm (last visited
Mar. 22, 2017). Indeed, the destruction of the buffalo and the subjugation of Native Americans
were seen as complimentary efforts by some at the time. James Throckmorton, a former governor
of Texas and U.S. Congressman, held this view. In 1876, he said, “it would be a great step forward
in the civilization of the Indians and the preservation of peace on the border if there was not a
buffalo in existence.” DANIEL BRISTER, IN THE PRESENCE OF BUFFALO: WORKING TO STOP THE
YELLOWSTONE SLAUGHTER (2013). A military general at the time is reported to have said that
buffalo hunters “did more to defeat the Indian nations in a few years than soldiers did in 50.” See
MARTIN J. SMITH, THE WILD DUCK CHASE: INSIDE THE STRANGE AND WONDERFUL WORLD OF
THE FEDERAL DUCK STAMP CONTEST (2013).
26 HORACE GREELEY, AN OVERLAND JOURNEY, FROM NEW YORK TO SAN FRANCISCO IN THE
SUMMER OF 1859 (1860). At the height of their population, it is estimated that there were as many
as 75 million buffalo living on America’s prairies. American buffalo (bison, bison), U.S FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/species/species_accounts/bio_buff.html (last visited Mar.
22, 2017).
27 Robert C. Kennedy, The Last Buffalo, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2001, https://www.nytimes.com/
learning/general/onthisday/harp/0606.html.
28 Nature: American Buffalo: Spirit of a Nation (PBS television broadcast Nov. 10, 1998).
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carcasses to rot alongside tracks from Nebraska to Utah.29 A
contemporary account of a hunt by rail in Harpers Weekly magazine
gives a sense of the scale of depredation:
Nearly every railroad train which leaves or arrives at Fort Hays on the
Kansas Pacific Railroad has its race with these herds of buffalo; and a
most interesting and exciting scene is the result. The train is “slowed” to
a rate of speed about equal to that of the herd; the passengers get out firearms which are provided for the defense of the train against the Indians,
and open from the windows and platforms of the cars a fire that resembles
a brisk skirmish. Frequently a young bull will turn at bay for a moment.
His exhibition of courage is generally his death-warrant, for the whole
fire of the train is turned upon him, either killing him or some member of
the herd in his immediate vicinity.30
There was even a celebrity culture built around killing bison.
Commercial bison hunter Buffalo Bill Cody derived his fame in no small
part from the widely shared, and possibly apocryphal, tale that he once
killed 4,000 bison over the course of just two hunting seasons.31 Even
future President Theodore Roosevelt, who later became an early and
passionate advocate for conserving America’s wild lands, participated in
the massacre. As a young man in 1883, Roosevelt spent a season in the
Dakota Territory hunting bison for sport.32 By 1900, the American bison
was on the brink of extinction, victim both to America’s relentless push
westward and to Americans’ desire for belts, coats, and other wearables
made of bison.33
At the same time the bison on America’s vast plains was being
decimated by commercial hunters, another far smaller animal that
29 Gilbert King, Where the Buffalo No Longer Roamed, SMITHSONIAN.COM (July 17, 2012),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/where-the-buffalo-no-longer-roamed-3067904/ (“The
railroads began to advertise excursions for ‘hunting by rail,’ where trains encountered massive
herds alongside or crossing the tracks. Hundreds of men aboard the trains climbed to the roofs and
took aim, or fired from their windows, leaving countless 1,500-pound animals where they died.”).
30 Buffalo Hunting: Shooting Buffalo From the Trains of the Kansas Pacific Railroad,
HARPER’S WEEKLY (Dec. 14, 1867).
31 JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE AMERICAN PAST: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 509 (2010).
32 SARAH WATTS, ROUGH RIDER IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE
POLITICS OF DESIRE 175 (2006). Interestingly, near the end of his life, former President Roosevelt
wrote eloquently about the value of preserving wild birds: “[Birds] should be saved because of
reasons unconnected with any return in dollars and cents . . . .[T]o lose the chance to see frigatebirds soaring in circles above the storm, or a file of pelicans winging their way homeward across
the crimson afterglow of the sunset, or a myriad terns flashing in the bright light of the midday as
they hover in a shifting maze above the beach-why, the loss is like the loss of a gallery of
masterpieces of the artists of old time.” THEODORE ROOSEVELT, A BOOK-LOVER’S HOLIDAY IN
THE OPEN 316–17 (1916).
33 American buffalo (bison, bison), supra note 26 (“Less than 300 wild [buffalo] remained in
the U.S. and Canada by the turn of the century out of the millions that once lived there.”).
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traveled at sixty miles an hour in mind-bendingly huge numbers above
those open expanses was suffering the same kind of depredation by
commercial hunters. The passenger pigeon,34 which darkened the skies
over the United States in flocks that could number in the tens of millions
of birds in the 17th and 18th centuries, was on the brink of extinction at
the beginning of the 20th century.35 Most Americans alive today have at
least a passing familiarity with the extinction story of the passenger
pigeon. But to truly understand the scale, scope, and speed of the
decimation of the passenger pigeon, which by some estimates was once
the most abundant bird species on Earth,36 one must first grasp the
ubiquity of the passenger pigeon in 19th century America.37 In his article,
Why the Passenger Pigeon Went Extinct, Barry Yeoman provides several
first-person accounts from those alive at that time attesting to the aweinspiring experience of being in the presence of these enormous flocks on
the wing, including a Potawatomi tribal leader comparing the sound made
by an advancing flock to “an army of horses laden with sleigh bells;” a
resident of Columbus, Ohio describing an approaching flock as a growing
cloud that blotted out the sun as it advanced toward the city; and the
following account in the Fond du Lac, Wisconsin paper, the
Commonwealth, of a group hunters witnessing adult male passenger
pigeons leaving their nesting site one morning in 1871: “Imagine a
thousand threshing machines running under full headway, accompanied
by as many steamboats groaning off steam, with an equal quota of R.R.
trains passing through covered bridges—imagine these massed into a
single flock, and you possibly have a faint conception of the terrific
roar.”38
And, yet, like the bison, at the turn of the 20th century, the passenger
pigeon was a species on the precipice of extinction. What caused this
incredible decline? In short, people did. People who viewed the passenger
pigeon as a biblically-sized plague that, like the locusts in the Old

34 The passenger pigeon’s scientific name is Ectopistes (“moving about or wandering”)
migratorius (“migrating”). The Passenger Pigeon, ENCYCLOPEDIA SMITHSONIAN,
http://www.si.edu/Encyclopedia_SI/nmnh/passpig.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (“The scientific
name carries the connotation of a bird that not only migrates in the spring and fall, but one that also
moves about from season to season to select the most favorable environment for nesting and
feeding.”).
35 See Barry Yeoman, Why the Passenger Pigeon Went Extinct, AUDUBON MAGAZINE, June
2014, http://www.audubon.org/magazine/may-june-2014/why-passenger-pigeon-went-extinct.
36 The Passenger Pigeon, supra note 34 (“It is believed that this species once constituted 25 to
40 percent of the total bird population of the United States.”).
37 There were an estimated 3–5 billion passenger pigeons in America when Europeans first
arrived. Id.
38 Yeoman, supra note 35.
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Testament,39 meant to lay waste to their crops and their livelihoods.
People who were living at a subsistence level and were desperate for the
jolt of protein a cooked passenger pigeon could inject into their meager
diets. And, most significantly, people who longed for the adornment a
passenger pigeon feather could add to their fancy headwear. Regular
people hunted passenger pigeons either to add protein to their diets or to
keep the enormous flocks from feasting on their crops,40 but the primary
cause of this dramatic population plunge was the practice known as
“millinery murder.”41 During the latter half of the 19th century
commercial (or market) hunters killed migratory birds, including
passenger pigeons, in enormous numbers to harvest their feathers for use
in fashionable women’s hats.42 As but one example, it is estimated that
during one nine-month period in the late 19th century, nearly 130,000
snowy egrets (prized for their pure white feathers) were killed by
commercial hunters in the United States for the London, England
millinery market alone.43
The industrial onslaught against passenger pigeons was
comprehensive, its impact devastating. In less than half a century the
passenger pigeon population went from inspiring comparisons with
biblical hordes to extinction. The last passenger pigeon left on the planet,
a lonely spinster named Martha, died without ever having laid a fertile
egg in the Cincinnati Zoo in 1914, four years before the passage of the
MBTA.44 In addition to the passenger pigeon, the list of birds killed and
trapped in numbers large enough to drive their species to extinction
during this period includes the only species of parakeet native to the

39 Exodus 10:12 (“And the Lord said to Moses, “Stretch out your hand over Egypt so that locusts
swarm over the land and devour everything growing in the fields, everything left by the hail.’”).
40 Yeoman, supra note 35 (noting that at the height of their abundance in North America, the
flocks of passenger pigeons were so large that birds could be hunted by waving a pole in the air to
knock down low-flying birds. Other “creative” techniques for bird slaughter enumerated in the
article included torching their roosts, asphyxiating them with burning sulfur, attacking them with
potatoes, and poisoning them with whiskey-soaked corn); see also Andrew G. Ogden, Dying for a
Solution: Incidental Taking Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, n.12 (2014) (discussing a 1978 massacre by commercial hunters of “hundreds of
thousands, indeed millions” of passenger pigeons nesting at Petoskey, Michigan).
41 William Souder, How Two Women Ended the Deadly Feather Trade, SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE, Mar. 2013, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/how-two-women-endedthe-deadly-feather-trade-23187277/ (“The plume trade was sordid business. Hunters killed and
skinned the mature birds, leaving orphaned hatchlings to starve or be eaten by crows.”).
42 Id.
43 Id. (quoting William Hornaday, director of New York Zoological Society, describing London
at this time as “the Mecca of the feather killers of the world.”).
44 Yeoman, supra note 35. The last known passenger pigeon to be killed in the wild was shot in
Pike County, Ohio in 1900. The bird was stuffed and mounted by the sheriff’s wife, who used
buttons instead of glass eyes, which led to its nickname of “Buttons.” Id.
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eastern United States, the Carolina Parakeet,45 whose brightly colored
feathers were prized for the adornment they gave to women’s hats, and
Heath Hens, a related species to the prairie chicken, that were hunted to
extinction for their delicious meat by American settlers in the late 19th
century.46
This widespread slaughter and species decimation, even occurring
during a time when the average American resembled in no way what
people today would describe as a “conservationist” (let alone its more
freighted adjectival cousin, “environmentalist”), finally began to draw the
attention of progressive Americans47 and some lawmakers. One such
lawmaker was Republican Congressman John F. Lacey of Iowa, who
proposed the bill in Congress that in 1900 became The Lacey Act,48 a
predecessor of the MBTA. In introducing his proposed bill, the country’s
first law specifically aimed at breaking the back of the market hunting
industry by banning the interstate shipping of illegally-killed animals,
Lacey said on the House floor:
The wild pigeon, formerly in this country in flocks of millions, has
entirely disappeared from the face of the earth . . . .We have given an
awful exhibition of slaughter and destruction, which may serve as a
warning to all mankind. Let us now give an example of wise conservation
of what remains of the gifts of nature.49
The Lacey Act is perhaps better known today for its contributions to
our understanding of the limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause power
to regulate interstate commerce, but, as the United States’ oldest federal
wildlife protection law, it remains an important tool in regulating the
hunting, trapping and poaching of animals and birds.
The legislative response to the widespread hunting and killing of
migratory birds by market hunters continued in 1913 with Congress’s
45 The Carolina Parakeet was declared extinct by the American ornithologists union in 1939. In
a sad parallel to the extinction of the passenger pigeon, like Martha—the last captive passenger
pigeon—the last known member of the species, Incas, also died in captivity at the Cincinnati Zoo
in 1918, the same year the MBTA became law. Ironically, Incas died in the same aviary cage used
to house the last passenger pigeon, Martha. See The last Carolina Parakeet, JOHN JAMES AUDUBON
CENTER AT MILL GROVE, http://johnjames.audubon.org/last-carolina-parakeet (last visited Mar.
22, 2017).
46 See REBECCA HEISMAN, The Sad Story of Booming Ben, Last of the Heath Hens, JSTOR
DAILY (Mar. 2, 2016), https://daily.jstor.org/last-heath-hen/.
47 Two such people were Boston socialites, Harriet Hemenway and Minna Hall, who in 1896
undertook a grassroots campaign in the parlors of Boston elites to convince their wealthy female
friends to boycott feathered hats. Emboldened by the success of this campaign (900 women agreed
to join the boycott), Hemenway and Hall started the Massachusetts Audubon Society, which would
eventually grow into the National Audubon Society, America’s leading bird conservation advocacy
group. See Souder, supra note 41, at 1.
48 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (2012).
49 33 CONG. REC. 4,871–72 (Apr. 30, 1900).
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passage of the Weeks-McLean Migratory Bird Act.50 The Act was
directly targeted at stopping millinery murder. It banned the spring
shooting of migratory game and insectivorous birds, and brought them
under the “custody and protection” of the federal government.51 While
the Weeks-McLean Migratory Bird Act had a short lifespan—it was ruled
unconstitutional by two federal district courts just a year later on the
grounds that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause
of the Unites States Constitution52—the growing legislative and popular
sentiment against indiscriminate market hunting of migratory birds was
clear. This sentiment would find its legislative outlet just three years later
in the MBTA.
C. The Act and its Amendments
The failure of the Weeks-McLean Migratory Bird Act to pass
constitutional muster meant the federal government remained essentially
powerless to control the very real and continuing threat to migratory birds
from interstate commercial hunting, which continued unabated (and
largely unregulated) in many states in the second decade of the 20th
century. While Congress lacked a tool for enforcement, the legislative
will to protect migratory birds from widespread slaughter that led to the
passage of the Weeks-McLean Act remained strong. After all, as shown
by the extinction of the passenger pigeon, the Carolina parakeet, and the
Heath Hen, all species that were brought to extinction in far less than one
century, there was good reason for Congress to be concerned about
continued threats to migratory birds from anthropogenic activities at this
time.
The problem Congress had to solve was how it could assume authority
for regulating the largely intrastate bird-killing activities from the states
without running afoul of constitutional limitations on its lawmaking
powers. Fortunately for Congress (and for the birds it sought to protect),
lawmakers in the United States were not alone in this concern for the
continued survival of the remaining migratory bird species. Some of these
migrating species crossed the border between the United States and
Canada during their migrations, and the Canadian government also had
50 Weeks-McLean Act of 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828, 847–48(repealed 1918). The Act was cosponsored by Massachusetts Representative John Weeks and Connecticut Senator George McLean.
51 Id.
52 United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914) (holding that Congress lacked the
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the hunting of migratory birds within a state); United
States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915) (“[I]f the [Weeks-McLean Act] shall, on any
ground, or for any reason, be upheld and enforced, it must surely follow [that] the many laws of the
separate States of this Union must hereafter be held inoperative, for there can be no divided
authority of the nation and several States over the single subject matter in issue.”).
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an interest in protecting them from industrial slaughter. This shared
conservational concern offered a solution to the problem that Congress
had been searching for—it would use its treaty-making powers,53 not its
lawmaking authority, to assert authority over activities directed at killing
birds.54
On August 16, 1916, two years after the Weeks-McClean Act was
declared unconstitutional, the United States and Great Britain (acting on
behalf of Canada, then part of the British Empire) signed a treaty for the
protection for certain species of birds which migrate between the United
States and Canada, in order to assure the preservation of species either
harmless or beneficial to man.55 The “Canada Treaty” was ratified by the
United States on September 1, 1916 and by Great Britain on October 20,
1916.56 It is clear from the legislative record of the Canada Treaty that the
U.S. federal government was strongly motivated to act in an effort to gain
control over the type of commercial over-hunting that led to the
extinction of the passenger pigeon.57 It is also the case that the specific
restrictions on human activity within the Canada Treaty all involve time,
place, and manner limitations on hunting and poaching of migratory
birds.58 It is important, however, to read these restrictions in light of the
Canada Treaty’s broad conservation goal to preserve migrating bird
species and to understand them within the context of the time they were
written, when the most pressing threat to migrating birds was
uncontrolled commercial hunting. In other words, while hunting and
poaching activities feature prominently in the enumerated restrictions in
the Canada Treaty, the broad conservation goal of species preservation
undergirding the treaty suggests that the two countries intended their
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Alexander K Obrecht, Migrating Towards an Incidental Take Permit Program:
Overhauling the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Comport with Modern Industrial Operations, 54
NAT. RES. J. 107, 113 (2014) (“Unable to protect migratory birds through its interstate commerce
powers, Congress next turned to its treaty powers and succeeded in wresting some of the power to
regulate wildlife away from the states.”).
55 Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory
Birds, Gr. Brit-U.S., T.S. No. 628 (Aug. 16, 1916) [hereinafter Canada Treaty].
56 Digest of Federal Resource Laws of Interest to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. FISH
& WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/treaty.html#MIGBIRDCAN (last
visited Mar. 22, 2017).
57 For an entertaining discussion of the legislative wrangling in the United States about the
Canada Treaty, see KURKPATRICK DORSEY, THE DAWN OF CONSERVATION DIPLOMACY: U.S.CANADA WILDLIFE PROTECTION TREATIES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 211–13 (2009) (quoting an
unnamed senator at the time telling James A. Reed, Senator from Missouri and emphatic opponent
of the Canada Treaty, “We have got to protect these birds and we are going to do it now, so sit
down, Jim!”) (emphasis in original); see also Kristina Roxan, Detailed Discussion on the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CTR., MICH. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW (2014).
58 See, e.g., Canada Treaty, supra note 55, Art. II (setting the locations and durations of “close
hunting seasons” for certain migratory bird species).
53
54
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agreement to reflect a more generalized desire to place reasonable limits
on anthropogenic harm to migratory birds, whatever form it took.59
It happens that at the time of the treaty, the human activity primarily
responsible for the dramatic depopulation of several bird species that
migrated between the United States and Canada and that spurred the
agreement was market hunting (an industrial directed activity). But it
seems highly likely from the legislative history of the Canada Treaty that
if another industrial cause was the primary driver of the depopulation,
even one that was not directed at birds but which nevertheless caused
them great harm (i.e., an industrial non-directed activity)—such as the
rapid deforestation of the eastern U.S. hardwood forests, which were
preferred habitat for several species of migratory birds, including the
passenger pigeon60—the Canada Treaty’s specific restrictions would be
different but the overarching goal of species preservation (“to assure the
preservation of species either harmless or beneficial to man”) would be
the same.
Put another way, the specific human activity causing the threat was
somewhat beside the point. What mattered most to the proponents of the
Canada Treaty was the deleterious impact on bird species from human
activity, not the activity itself.61 In a letter to President Woodrow Wilson
encouraging him to sign the Canada Treaty, Secretary of State Robert
Lansing, chief U.S. negotiator of the Treaty, listed commercial hunting
as but one of several activities (along with increased agriculture and
draining of swamps and meadows) that had “so altered conditions” in the
United States in recent years that “few migratory game birds nest within

59 The Canada Treaty’s preamble attributes the danger of bird species extermination to “a lack
of adequate protection.” Canada Treaty, supra note 55, Preamble.
60 LOWELL DINGUS AND TIMOTHY ROWE, MISTAKEN EXTINCTION: DINOSAUR EVOLUTION
AND THE ORIGIN OF BIRDS 286–91 (1997) (arguing that the destruction of the passenger pigeon’s
habitat in the eastern United States was a larger contributor to the extinction of the species than was
rampant and uncontrolled hunting by commercial hunters).
61 This view also finds support in the 1995 amendments to the Canada Treaty between the
United States and Canada (now acting on its own behalf), which, in addition to providing for the
subsistence hunting of protected birds by Alaska Natives and Aboriginal people in Alaska and
northern Canada, reaffirmed the countries’ broad conservation goals and replaced most of the
original treaty’s provisions with specific restrictions on anthropogenic harms that extend well
beyond hunting and poaching. Protocol Amending the 1916 Convention for the Protection of
Migratory Birds, Can.-U.S., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-28, 1995 WL 877199 (Dec. 5, 1995).
Specifically, the amendments provided that the U.S. and Canada would “take appropriate measures
to preserve and enhance the environment of migratory birds[,] seek means to prevent damage to
such birds and their environments, including damage resulting from pollution[, and] pursue
cooperative agreements to conserve habitat essential to migratory bird populations.” For a thorough
discussion of the 1995 amendments to the Canada Treaty see Alexander K. Obrecht, supra note 54,
at 114–15; see also Development of a Permit for Incidental Take of Migratory Birds, HOLLAND &
HART & INGAA FOUND., 9–10 (2010).

168

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 35:153

our limits” and made the Treaty necessary.62 Lansing went on to describe
the Canada Treaty as a “conservation measure of prime importance.”63
The United States implemented the Canada Treaty by passing the
MBTA in 1918.64 The MBTA was challenged almost immediately after
its passage by the state of Missouri, which brought suit to prevent U.S.
Game Warden, Ray P. Holland, from enforcing the Act against Missouri
residents.65 Missouri argued that the MBTA unconstitutionally interfered
with Missouri’s reserved rights under the Tenth Amendment and violated
the state’s sovereignty.66 The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court in
1920.67 In a 7-2 decision, the Court found no violation of the Tenth
Amendment, and held that the MBTA was a necessary and proper means
of effectuating the Canada Treaty under Article I, Section 8, of the
Constitution.68 The Court noted that the protection of migratory birds that
reside in multiple states and countries requires national action in the form
of an international treaty enforced with a congressional act, as it was done
with the MBTA.69 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes, noted that
“[b]ut for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any
powers to deal with.”70 At long last, the U.S. government had the law it
wanted to thwart anthropogenic activities that had led to the decimation
of the passenger pigeon and other migratory bird species. The question
for the next one hundred years would be exactly to which of these
activities (and actors) the new law should apply.
It is noteworthy that the new law did not simply mirror the Canada
Treaty’s prioritization of impact over cause, but expanded it in several
important respects, including, most significantly, in its broad definition
of prohibited acts and in its use of a strict liability standard for
violations.71 The bird species selected for protection under the MBTA in
1918 included many non-game birds, offering further evidence that
Congress at the time was concerned with protecting birds from harms that

62 H.R. REP. NO. 65-243, at 2. Later in that same letter, Secretary Lansing wrote that “millions
of people in the United States are deeply interested in the conservation and increase of our bird life
from an esthetic viewpoint, as well as on account of their practical utility.” Id. at 3.
63 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
64 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–11 (2012).
65 United States v. Samples, 258 F. 479 (W.D. Mo. 1919).
66 Id.
67 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
68 Id. at 432–35.
69 Id. at 435.
70 Id.
71 See Monica Carusello, Can an Oil Pit Take a Bird?: Why the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
Should Apply to Inadvertent Takings and Killings by Oil Pits, 31 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 87, 108
(“Congress was unmistakably primarily concerned with hunting [when it passed the MBTA];
however, the statutory language also makes clear that hunting was not its sole concern.”).
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went beyond the damage wrought by hunters and poachers.72 As one
congressman at the time described it, “[t]he birds dealt with [in the
MBTA] are of three classes—migratory game birds, migratory
insectivorous birds, and migratory nongame birds.”73 Further, as was the
case in the Canada Treaty, the drafters of the MBTA explicitly recognized
the value of preserving birds for their aesthetic value to humans as well
as the irreplaceable benefit to farmers birds provided by eating insects
that feed on crops.74
This expansion of the Canada Treaty through the MBTA was not an
accident; it was entirely intended by the drafters of the Act.75 The
congressional opponents of the Act recognized this expansion and
expressed their concerns about the MBTA’s potentially extensive reach.
Among these opponents was Alabama congressman George Huddleston,
who, referring to the provision in the Act that made it unlawful to take a
bird except in accordance with rules promulgated by the Secretary of the
Interior, said: “If the secretary . . . does not want you to do so, you will
never kill another duck or any bird protected by this bill, whether it is a
game bird or not . . . .[T]hat is all there is to that.”76 The broad
conservational spirit animating the Act can also be seen in the statement
of Iowa Congressman Simeon D. Fess in 1918 in support of the bill: “I
am in favor of protecting the birds. My admiration for our little friends of
the air makes me unfriendly to the habit of killing off these winged
visitors, whether game birds, migratory birds, or other species.”77
Unlike the Canada Treaty, the MBTA does not limit itself to placing
time, place, and manner restrictions on migratory bird hunting activities
to preserve bird populations. To the contrary, the Act defines its reach in

72 Among the bird species covered by the MBTA in 1918 were many species of song and
insectivorous birds that were not hunted by humans.
73 56 CONG. REC. H7369 (June 4, 1918) (statement of Rep. Temple).
74 See id. at H7458 (1918) (statement of Rep. Smith: “If we are going to have a treaty about
migratory birds, let us have some place where they can come and remain safely and be a pleasure
and companions.”); id. at H7360 (statement of Rep. Stedman pointing out that among the MBTA’s
many purposes is protecting insectivorous migratory birds from harm).
75 See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1082 (D. Colo. 1999)
(“[T]here is no clearly expressed legislative intent that the MBTA regulates only physical conduct
associated with hunting or poaching.”).
76 56 CONG. REC. H7364 (1918) (statement of Rep. Huddleston).
77 Id. at H7357. Other members of congress at the time expressed similar views about the scope
of the Act, including Rep. Stedman (“[T]he purpose of this bill is to give effect to the convention . . .
Insectivorous migratory birds as well as migratory game birds are embraced in the terms of the
treaty.” Id. at H7364.) and Rep. Huddleston (“[This bill] puts it within the power of the Secretary
of Agriculture to forbid the killing of game birds as much as the killing of song or insectivorous
birds. They are put on the same level.” Id. at H7369.).
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almost the broadest possible terms, making it unlawful at any time, and
by any means or in any manner, for a “person”78 to:
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill,
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to
purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, import,
cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for
transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause
to be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or
export, any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird,
or any product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or
is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest,
or egg thereof.79

A “take” of a migratory bird is defined in the rules implementing the
MBTA as pursuing, hunting, shooting, wounding, killing, trapping,
capturing, or collecting a protected bird, or any attempt to do so.80
It is apparent from the Act’s broad take language, its strict liability
formulation that requires no mens rea (mental state) to establish
misdemeanor liability, and from much of its legislative history that the
proponents of the MBTA (both in Congress and in the executive branch)
believed they were creating a law that would have application to humancaused harm to birds beyond just that caused by out-of-season hunting
and poaching. Congress’s ambitious yet realistic approach to the Act’s
conservation goal, which sought to balance the MBTA’s preservation
ethic with the country’s industrial, commercial, and residential birdkilling reality, can also be seen in the fact that Section 703(a)’s broad
definition of prohibited activities under the Act is prefaced with the
caveat, “unless and except as permitted by regulations made as
hereinafter provided in this subchapter.”81 This opened the door to
rulemakings by the Department of Interior to decriminalize certain
activities that kill protected birds.82 Further, Section 704(a) of the Act
provides that the Secretary of the Interior is “authorized and directed,
from time to time, . . . to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by
what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow
hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment,
78 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2013). A “Person” is defined in 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 as “any individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, club, or private body, any one or all, as the context requires.”
79 16 U.S.C. § 703(a).
80 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2016).
81 16 U.S.C. § 703(a).
82 See also Kalyani Robbins, Paved with Good Intentions: The Fate of Strict Liability Under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 42 ENVTL. L. 579, 605 (2012) (“Congress made a sweeping
prohibition that would be unrealistic to enforce—a prohibition that could, at some point, touch
nearly everyone’s activities—and then asked the Secretary to carve out an enforceable plan.”).
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transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or
egg thereof, and to adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing
the same.”83 However, to date, outside of rules allowing for the issuance
of permits for the intentional take of protected birds for certain, limited
public, scientific, and educational purposes,84 and for incidental takings
of migratory birds by military readiness activities, the Department of the
Interior has not altered through rulemaking the MBTA’s fundamental
prohibition in Section 703(a) as it applies to industrial and nonindustrial
activities that intentionally or unintentionally kill birds.
The MBTA has been amended three separate times to implement
migratory bird protection treaties with other countries: first with Mexico
in 1936 (“Mexico Treaty”),85 then with Japan in 1972 (“Japan Treaty”),86
and finally with the U.S.S.R. (present-day Russia) in 1976 (“Russia
Treaty”).87 While the four treaties implemented through the MBTA differ
in certain respects, they share the same guiding conservation principle
first enunciated in the Canada Treaty. In its preamble, the Mexico Treaty
provides that the purpose of the treaty is the protection of migratory birds
from extinction.88 Similarly, the Japan Treaty describes its reason for
existence as a desire by the two countries to “cooperate in taking
measures for the management, protection, and prevention of the
extinction of certain birds.”89 The Russia Treaty followed form with its
statement that the United States and the U.S.S.R. entered into the treaty
to “cooperate in implementing measures for the conservation of
migratory birds and their environment.”90 Like the Canada Treaty,
however, each of these treaties expressly recognizes that the signatory
countries must allow the taking of protected birds in certain situations so
16 U.S.C. § 704(a).
50 C.F.R. § 21. Under the Service’s migratory bird permit program, regional offices issue
permits for the intentional take of listed birds for the following listed purposes: falconry, raptor
propagation, scientific collecting, rehabilitation, conservation education, migratory game bird
propagation, salvage, depredation control, taxidermy, and waterfowl sale and disposal. See Permits
Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/permits/overview/overview.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2017). According to the Service, these permits “enable the public to engage
in legitimate wildlife-related activities that would otherwise be prohibited by law . . . [and] ensure
that such activities are carried out in a manner that safeguards wildlife.” Id.
85 Convention between the United States of America and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory
Birds and Game Mammals, Mex.-U.S., 50 Stat. 1311 (Feb 7, 1936) [hereinafter Mexico Treaty].
86 Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction, and Their
Environment, Japan-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 7990 (Mar. 4, 1972) [hereinafter Japan Treaty].
87 Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
T.I.A.S. No. 9073 (Nov. 19, 1976) [hereinafter Russia Treaty].
88 Mexico Treaty, supra note 85, Preamble.
89 Japan Treaty, supra note 86, Preamble.
90 Russia Treaty, supra note 87, Preamble.
83
84
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as not to unreasonably burden their citizens’ uses of land for commercial
and recreational activities. The Mexico Treaty permits the “rational
utilization of migratory birds for the purpose of sport as well as for food,
commerce and industry.”91 The Japan Treaty provides that the “taking of
the migratory birds or their eggs shall be prohibited,” but also allows for
exceptions to this prohibition in accordance with Japan and American
laws and regulations for “scientific, educational, propagative or other
specific purposes not inconsistent with the objectives of [the Japan
Treaty].”92 The Russia Treaty contains essentially the same language as
the Japan Treaty in this regard.93
Congress amended the MBTA in 1986 to require scienter for a felony
conviction under Section 707(b), which concerns taking a migratory bird
for the purpose of selling it.94 This amendment came in response to a Sixth
Circuit decision in United States v. Wulff, which held that the absence of
a knowledge requirement for a felony criminal conviction under Section
707(b) violated the Constitution’s due process requirements.95 The
amendment added the word “knowingly” to Section 707(b) to “cure the
unintended infirmity” and “require proof that the defendant knew (1) that
his actions constituted a taking, sale, barter, or offer to sell or barter, as
the case may be and (2) that the item so taken, sold, or bartered was a bird
or portion thereof.”96 It is significant that Congress expressly did not add
a scienter requirement to misdemeanor MBTA violations under Section
707(a) when it amended Section 707(b), leaving Section 707(a)’s strict
liability scheme intact.97
The last significant amendment to the MBTA occurred in 1998, when
Congress added an intent requirement for “baited field offenses.”98 Prior

Mexico Treaty, supra note 85, Preamble.
Japan Treaty, supra note 86, at Art. III.I.
93 Russia Treaty, supra note 87, at Art. II.I (providing that “[e]xceptions to these prohibitions
must be made on the basis of laws, decrees or regulations [for] scientific, educational, propagative,
or other specific purposes not inconsistent with the principles of this Convention[.]”).
94 16 U.S.C. § 707(b).
95 United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (1986) (“[T]o be convicted of a felony under the
MBTA, a crime unknown to the common law which carries a substantial penalty, Congress must
require the prosecution to prove the defendant acted with some degree of scienter. Otherwise, a
person acting with a completely innocent state of mind could be subjected to a severe penalty and
grave damage to his reputation. This, in our opinion, the Constitution does not allow.”); S. REP.
NO. 99–445, at 16 (1986) (“The effect of [the Wulff decision] is that the felony provisions are
meaningless within the 6th Circuit and uncertainty now exists throughout the rest of the country.”).
96 S. REP. NO. 99–445, at 16 (1986).
97 Id. (“Nothing in this amendment is intended to alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for
misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. 707(a), a standard which has been upheld in many
Federal court decisions.”).
98 Act of Nov. 10, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, 100 Stat. 3582, 3590; Migratory Bird Treaty
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-312, 112 Stat. 2956.
91
92
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to this amendment, a hunter could be convicted of a misdemeanor
violation under the MBTA for taking a bird over a baited field even if the
hunter had no knowledge that the field was baited.99 The amendment
added a mens rea requirement that the government to secure a conviction
show the hunter “knew or should have known” he was hunting with bait
or over a baited field.100 Again, as with the 1986 amendment to Section
707(b), Congress took pains to clarify that this amendment did not alter
Section 707(a)’s general strict liability standard for non-baited field
misdemeanor violations: “The elimination of strict liability, however,
applies only to hunting with bait or over baited areas, and is not intended
in any way to reflect upon the general application of strict liability under
the MBTA [for misdemeanor offenses].”101
Lest the reader of this Article obtain the false impression that the story
of the MBTA is one of unremitting controversy and disappointment, it is
worth noting that enforcement of the Act is credited with the survival and
recovery of many previously imperiled bird species. Among these species
are the snowy egret, whose luminously white feathers were so popular for
use in women’s hats in the 19th century that for a time they were worth
more per ounce than gold,102 and the majestically colored wood duck,
which was hunted to near extinction at the turn of the 20th century.103
Despite this laudable record of species preservation, however, significant
controversy about the appropriate reach of the MBTA continues as it
enters its second century. The remainder of this article will examine this
controversy and suggest a category-based approach to resolve it.
II. THE CATEGORIES
The list of anthropogenic causes of bird deaths is long and varied, and
includes a spectrum of human behaviors ranging from deliberate actions
directed at killing birds to passive acts that are in no way intended to harm
birds but nevertheless do, and everything in between. It is quickly
apparent from a survey of the cases, law review articles, treatises, and
other commentary written about the MBTA that there is precious little
99 See, e.g., United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding criminal
MBTA conviction for hunting over baited field even though evidence showed hunter did not know
field was baited).
100 50 C.F.R. § 20.21(i) (2016).
101 See S. REP. NO. 105-366, at 2 (1998).
102 See Dave Taft, Snowy Egrets, Once Fashion Victims, Always Elegant Predators, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/nyregion/snowy-egrets-once-fashionvictims-always-elegant-predators.html (“From near extinction, the snowy egret is once again a
fixture along any number of coastal waterways and quiet freshwater ponds and creeks — a common
bird along New York City’s summer shorelines.”).
103 GUY BALDASSARRE, DUCKS, GEESE, AND SWANS OF NORTH AMERICA 280–81 (1942).
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about the Act or its application that is generally agreed upon, except this:
the drafters of the MBTA did not intend to criminalize every possible act
that could result in the death of a protected bird. Nearly all commentators
agree on this point both as a matter of common sense and from a close
reading of the statute, which, after all, is quite broadly written. The
disagreement comes in defining what acts should be included within the
purview of the Act and which should be left out.
This Article proposes a middle-ground approach to these two extremes
based on a category-based approach to criminal misdemeanor liability
under the MBTA: (i) misdemeanor strict liability should apply to the
injuring or killing of a protected bird associated with Industrial and
Nonindustrial Directed Activities (the “Shotgun”), unless such injury or
death is permitted by applicable hunting and poaching regulations; (ii)
misdemeanor strict liability should apply to the injuring or killing of a
protected bird associated with Industrial Non-Directed Activities (the
“Deadly Oil Pit”), unless such injury or death is permitted by an
Incidental Take Permit previously obtained by the industrial actor
pursuant to the MBTA incidental take permit system proposed in this
Article; and (iii) any injury or death of a protected bird associated with
Nonindustrial Non-Directed Activities (the “Cute Kitten”) should be
expressly excluded from misdemeanor liability under the MBTA rather
than continuing to rely on prosecutorial discretion to avoid absurd
prosecutions.
A. Industrial and Nonindustrial Directed Activities
The MBTA does not prohibit all hunting of migratory birds. In fact, as
discussed above, the Act specifically authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to adopt regulations permitting the hunting of migratory birds that
are compatible with the terms of the Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Russia
Treaties.104 Each year, the Department of Interior, acting through the
Service, publishes framework hunting regulations in the Federal Register
with the goal of keeping game bird harvest levels “compatible with a
population’s ability to maintain itself.”105 Among other things, the
framework regulations set the outside dates for opening and closing of
hunting seasons, daily bag limits, and shooting hours.106 The earliest
16 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2012).
See Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/regulations/migratory-bird-huntingregulations.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2017). The MBTA designates 170 of its over 1,000 protected
bird species as “game birds.” FAQs/Commonly Asked Questions, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/faqs.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
106 Id.
104
105
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beginning date and latest end date for a state’s hunting season are set by
the MBTA.107 It is only where a hunter kills a protected bird out of season,
exceeds his or her daily bag limit, or otherwise violates the terms of the
hunting license that a MBTA violation may obtain. These violations
typically occur in one of two scenarios, a commercial hunt run by a
hunting guide or, more commonly, a noncommercial hunt by a
recreational shooter.
1. The Activity (“The Shotgun”)
a. Industrial Directed Activities
A video opens with five Canada geese gliding gracefully in the dawn
light toward what appear to be a gaggle feeding in a wheat field. With the
volume off, it would be easy to mistake this video for a high-productionvalue British Broadcasting Company (“BBC”) nature show. With the
volume on, however, the viewer quickly understands that this is not a
BBC production. In place of the dulcet narration of Sir David
Attenborough is a soundtrack of pulsating heavy metal music
incongruously accompanying the birds on their arcing path to the ground.
When the geese are only a few feet off the ground and have set their wings
to land, three large men dressed head-to-toe in camouflage jump to their
feet from the coffin blinds they had been lying in, shotguns raised. One
of the men yells, “Kill ‘em, boys” and all three begin to shoot into the
geese, which have realized too late the trap they have fallen into and are
desperately flapping their wings to gain elevation and escape. The video
slows to half speed to allow the viewer to see the shotgun pellets impact
the birds, sending them spinning one-by-one to the ground where they lay
crumpled next to the plastic goose decoys they mistook for real birds.
Standing over the dead geese, the same man who had given the kill order
screams with obvious glee, “You’re not as tough as you think you are,
Mr. Honker.”108
The man in the video is Jeffrey Foiles, an Illinois-based hunting guide,
and the footage described is part of his Fallin’ Skies series of DVDs,
which have been described as “avian-death porn” for their gleeful tone
and graphic depictions of birds being shot by Mr. Foiles and his clients.109

50 C.F.R. § 20.100 (2016).
OutdoorSporting, Fallin’ Skies 4 Duck Hunting Video, YOUTUBE (uploaded Jan. 18, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=67G8fPGjb9w.
109 See Nicholas Phillips, Jeff Foiles was a rock star in the world of waterfowl hunting—until
the feds drew a target on his back, RIVERFRONT TIMES, October 27, 2011,
http://www.riverfronttimes.com/stlouis/jeff-foiles-was-a-rock-star-in-the-world-of-waterfowlhunting-until-the-feds-drew-a-target-on-his-back/Content?oid=2496416 (describing Fallin’ Skies
107
108
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Like the market hunters in the late 19th century, Foiles, through his
guiding business, The Fallin’ Skies Strait Meat Duck Club LLC, made
his living by hunting birds. In Foiles’ case, his income came not from
sending bird feathers to market but from clients who paid him to take
them on guided bird hunts. And like many of those market hunters, he did
so with little apparent regard for species preservation. Unlike those
market hunters, however, Foiles conducted his hunts in an America with
well-developed federal and state laws regulating the time, place, and
manner of bird hunting.
On December 9, 2010, Foiles was indicted by a federal grand jury in
Illinois on twenty-three felony counts, including violations of the Lacey
Act and the MBTA.110 The indictment followed an investigation into
Foiles’ guiding activities by the Service.111 Among other things, the
indictment alleged that from 2003 to 2007, Foiles knowingly transported
and sold ducks and geese that had been hunted and killed by his clients
in excess of their daily individual bag limits in violation of the MBTA,
falsified hunting records at his club to conceal these violations, and
filmed the illegal hunts for his Fallin’ Skies commercial hunting videos.112
In June 2011, Foiles pleaded guilty to one Lacey Act misdemeanor
violation for the unlawful sale of wildlife and one MBTA misdemeanor
violation for unlawfully taking migratory game birds, and the Fallin’
Skies Strait Meat Duck Club LLC pleaded guilty to one Lacey Act felony
violation for the unlawful sale of wildlife in violation of the Act and one
felony count for making false writings in a matter within the jurisdiction
of the Service.113 On September 21, 2011, Foiles was sentenced to thirteen
months in prison and fined $100,000 for these violations of the MBTA
and the Lacey Act.114
5 as a “three hour murder-fest” and Jeffrey Foiles as “a brash, hard-driving, all-American badass
bird assassin.”).
110 Professional Duck Hunter Charged with Guiding Illegal Waterfowl Hunts in Central Illinois,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Dec. 9, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/professional-duck-hunter-charged-guiding-illegal-waterfowlhunts-central-illinois.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Illinois Man Pleads Guilty to Federal Duck Hunting Violations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE,
OFFICE
OF
PUB.
AFFAIRS
(June
23,
2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/illinois-man-pleads-guilty-federal-duck-hunting-violations.
114 Professional Illinois Duck Hunter Jeff Foiles Sentenced to More Than One Year in Jail and
Fines for Illegal Hunting and Guiding Activities, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Sept. 21, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/professional-illinoisduck-hunter-jeff-foiles-sentenced-more-one-year-jail-and-fines-illegal. In a separate matter in
Canada related to his guiding and hunting activities in that country, Foiles pleaded guilty to four
violations of Canada’s Migratory Birds Convention Act and one violation of Canada’s Criminal
Code for torturing ducks and geese, causing them unnecessary pain and suffering. United States
Poacher Fined for Violations of Canada Laws While Hunting Waterfowl, ENV’T & CLIMATE
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b. Nonindustrial Directed Activities
Around the time that Jeffrey Foiles was starting his commercial bird
hunting guiding business, another bird hunter ran afoul of the MBTA.
Unlike Foiles, David Morgan hunted for pleasure rather than pecuniary
gain. Morgan’s MBTA troubles stemmed from a duck hunting trip he and
six friends took to Sawdust Pond in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana in
2001. Morgan was hunting in his canoe when a Louisiana Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries agent pulled alongside him. The agent found eight
dead ducks in Morgan’s canoe, which were two more than he was allowed
to take in a single day under the terms of his duck hunting license. Morgan
told the agent that only two of the ducks were his and that his dog had
retrieved the other six that were shot by other hunters. Morgan was
nevertheless charged with a misdemeanor violation of the MBTA for
taking a listed bird beyond daily possession limits. At trial, the district
court found Morgan guilty of a misdemeanor under Section 707(a) and
sentenced him to three years probation and fined him $1,000. On appeal,
the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Morgan’s argument that
his misdemeanor conviction should be overturned because he did not
intend to violate the MBTA.115 The Court noted that there was no dispute
that Morgan was found in possession of a number of ducks exceeding his
daily bag limit, and held that “possessing migratory game birds exceeding
the daily bag limit in violation of the MBTA and its attendant regulations
is a strict liability offense.”116
2. The Current State of the Law
The applicability of the MBTA to industrial and nonindustrial
activities directed at killing birds, such as those undertaken by hunters
Jeffrey Foiles and David Morgan has never been seriously questioned by
the courts. In case after case, the courts have found that these “shotgun”
activities are precisely the kind of intentional acts that Congress intended
to criminalize when it passed the MBTA.117 Moreover, over the MBTA’s
one hundred years of its existence, Congress has steadfastly maintained
CHANGE CANADA (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.ec.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang=En&n=
BBFFF6A3-1. Foiles was fined $14,500 USD for these violations by an Edmonton provincial court
and banned from hunting in Canada for three years. Id.
115 United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 2002).
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 41 F. Supp. 433, 434 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (finding hunter
guilty of misdemeanor MBTA conviction for shooting a duck from a powerboat); United States v.
Tucker, 934 F. Supp. 1249, 1251 (D. Colo. 1996) (hunter who shot migratory bird with illegally
modified shotgun guilty of violating MBTA); United States v. Abbate, 439 F. Supp. 2d 625, 629
(E.D. La. 2006) (hunter who shot two wood ducks after legal hunting hours guilty of violating
MBTA).
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the MBTA’s strict liability standard for misdemeanor violations of the
Act. In addition to out-of-season hunting and poaching violations, courts
have consistently held that the MBTA applies to other directed activities,
both commercial and noncommercial, that take protected birds, such as
poisoning them.118
3. The Proposed Approach
The legislative consistency and judicial clarity around the application
of the MBTA to directed industrial and nonindustrial activities is a
welcome oasis of certainty in the morass of confusion that surrounds the
enforcement of the MBTA in other contexts. There is little genuine
controversy that these directed activities are comfortably within the
purview of the Act, as it was conceived by its drafters, maintained by
Congress, interpreted by the courts, and enforced by the Service.
Therefore, the proposed approach for this category is quite simple: don’t
fix what isn’t broken and maintain the status quo. It gets harder from here.
B. Industrial and Nonindustrial Non-Directed Activities
Under a plain reading of the MBTA, any act that results in the nonpermitted death of a protected bird, regardless of the intent behind it,
violates the Act and triggers criminal liability for the bird hunter, the oil
and gas producer, or the housecat owner, as the case may be. Conversely,
under a more restrictive reading of the MBTA, such as that employed by
the Fifth Circuit in the Citgo Petroleum case, only those acts that are
directed at killing birds trigger MBTA liability.119 Under this reading the
hunter who shoots one bird out-of-season or in excess of his daily bag
limit should face prosecution under the Act, while the oil and gas
producer whose oil and gas wastewater pit kills fifty birds or the housecat
owner whose cat kills seventy-five birds should not. The former
interpretation of the Act generally comports with the legislative intent
behind the MBTA to protect certain bird species from anthropogenic
harm, but is over inclusive in assigning liability to acts that the MBTA’s
drafters would surely have seen as beyond the reasonable scope of the
Act. The latter reading is fundamentally contrary to the conservational
spirit behind the Act and fails to reach human causes of bird deaths that,
while not directed at killing birds, nevertheless closely resemble the types
of activities that spurred passage of the MBTA.

118 See, e.g., United States v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding MBTA
misdemeanor conviction of defendant who deliberately poisoned two protected birds).
119 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 493–94 (5th Cir. 2015).
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1. Industrial Non-Directed Activities
a. The Activity (the “Deadly Oil Pit”)
The operation of open-air oil and wastewater pits by oil and gas
exploration and development companies is used to represent the
industrial non-directed activity category because it is a lawful industrial
activity responsible for a significant number of incidental bird deaths,
which is undertaken in a regulated environment by corporate actors that
profit financially from the activity, and who reasonably can be expected
to know that their activity kills birds and accompanying legal
implications of those deaths. This description and the proposed MBTA
approach applies equally well to the electricity industry (including both
the transmission and production segments), which is the other primary
industrial activity responsible for incidental takes of protected birds.120
When migrating, a bird must at times come to earth to rest and recover.
Similar to the succor provided to tired long-distance motorists by the fuel,
food, and available (if unpleasant) bathrooms found in rest stops and gas
stations along America’s highways and interstates, landing spots for
migratory birds, commonly called stopover sites, provide an essential
opportunity for the migrating bird to eat, drink, and recover before
continuing its journey.121 In the vast majority of cases, the stopover sites
selected by migrating birds are the safe and nourishing harbors they
appear to be from the air. But sometimes looks can be deceiving—and
deadly. Hundreds of thousands of migrating birds die each year from
selecting a seemingly benign body of water as a stopover site on their
journey that turns out to be an open-air oil and wastewater pit.122 These
poisonous traps bring a bird’s migratory journey to a premature and tragic
end. They also create potential civil and criminal liability for the pits’
owners under the MBTA.
With many millions of individual birds enjoying protection under the
Act, the odds are fairly good that the next time you see a bird flying high
120 An estimated 25 million migratory birds are killed annually from colliding with electrical
facilities, and another 5.4 million die each year from electrocutions. See Threats to Birds:
Migratory Bird Mortality – Questions and Answers, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/birds/bird-enthusiasts/threats-to-birds.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
121 An indication of the critical importance of these stopover sites for bird recovery can be seen
in the fact that migrating birds typically spend more time at these stopover sites than in the air
during migration. See Jennie Miller, How Do Tired Birds Choose Where To Stop During
Migration?, CORNELL LAB OF ORNITHOLOGY (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.allaboutbirds.org/howdo-tired-birds-choose-where-to-stop-during-migration/.
122 The Service estimates that exposure to open-air oil and wastewater pits causes an estimated
500,000 to 1 million bird deaths annually. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE
INEFFECTIVENESS OF FLAGGING TO DETER MIGRATORY BIRDS FROM OILFIELD PRODUCTION
SKIM PITS AND RESERVE PITS (2011).
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overheard, rushing to points unknown, that bird belongs to an MBTAcovered species. At present, there are over 1,000 species of birds
protected under the MBTA, including several species of ducks, over
thirty species of sparrows, and both the bald and the golden eagle.123 In
total, the Act provides protection to almost all native bird species
currently existing in the United States, including, somewhat strangely
given the Act’s name and original purpose, some species that do not
migrate at all.124 If a bird has the misfortune of choosing an open-air oil
and wastewater pit as a stopover site during its journey over the Unites
States and dies because of it, the odds would seem certain that a violation
has occurred under Section 707(a) of the MBTA, which does not require
that the party intended to take a migratory bird for liability to attach.125
Under the plain language of the Act, violators can be prosecuted on a
strict liability basis without regard to the intent behind their actions (even
if otherwise lawful) that resulted in the taking or killing of a protected
migratory bird.126 It would seem to follow from this that the owner of the
pit, likely a company involved in oil and gas development,127 in which a
protected bird dies should prepare for an enforcement action under the
MBTA, even though the owner’s intended purpose for creating and
operating the pit was not to kill protected birds.128 While such an
123 Revised List of Migratory Birds, 78 Fed. Reg. 65,844 (Nov. 1, 2013) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 10.13(c)(1) (2015)). The MBTA protects only species of migratory birds that are “native” to the
United States. “Native” is defined under the Act to mean bird species that occur in the United States
or its territories “as the result of natural biological or ecological processes.” Migratory bird species
that were introduced to the United States by humans, either intentionally or unintentionally, are not
protected under the Act, unless the introduction is the reintroduction of a migratory bird species
that (i) was once native to the United States or its territories and extant in 1918 when the Act was
passed, (ii) was completely killed off after 1918 throughout its range in the United States and its
territories, and (iii) is being reintroduced by the Federal government. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
124 See Sabrina Imbler, A Hundred-Year Legacy: The Modern Role of the Migratory Bird
Treaty, AUDUBON (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.audubon.org/news/a-hundred-year-legacymodern-role-migratory-bird-treaty.
125 When enacted in 1918, the MBTA provided one strict liability crime for violating the Act,
but a Congressional amendment to the “Violations and Penalties” section of the Act in 1960
separated § 707 into misdemeanor crimes for violating any provision of the Act (§ 707(a)) and
felony crimes for sale or take with intent to sell (§ 707(b)), both with strict liability still the standard.
See Pub. L. No. 86-732, 74 Stat. 866 (1960). In 1986, Congress for the first time loosened the strict
liability standard under the Act when it amended § 707(b) to require that an entity “knowingly”
take a migratory bird to be held liable under this section. See Pub. L. No. 99-645 (1986), 100 Stat.
3582. Crucially, however, the 1986 amendment to the Act did not add a mens rea requirement to §
707(a)’s misdemeanor violation, leaving it a strict liability standard.
126 16 U.S.C. § 707(a).
127 The plain language of the MBTA extends liability to incidental killings of protected birds by
corporate actors. See id.
128 Oil and gas producers are by no means alone in this predicament. Other potential liability
targets under a strict reading of the MBTA include building owners, automobile operators, and pet
owners, each of which, as a category, is responsible for millions of unintentional takes of migratory
birds each year. See Meredith Blaydes Lilley & Jeremy Firestone, Wind Power, Wildlife, and the
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enforcement action under the MBTA may indeed come, whether the pit
owner is ultimately found liable under the MBTA for a bird’s death will
depend upon where in the U.S. the offending oil and wastewater pit is
located.
Oil and wastewater pits, like uninteresting people at a cocktail party,
have the quality of being at once ubiquitous and rarely noted. The openair variety of oil and wastewater pits (hereinafter “open-air pits”) poses a
significant risk of injury or death to migratory birds that make the mistake
of using them as a stopover site. These open-air pits are used by oil and
gas producers throughout the exploration and production process and
serve several different purposes, including storing drilling fluid and
separating oil from produced water.129 In all cases, the open-air pits
contain a toxic blend of organic and inorganic compounds that often
prove fatal to a bird that ingests them while preening its contaminated
feathers.130 Birds also die from drowning in the open-air pits when the oil
in their feathers makes it impossible to stay afloat and from cold stress
when the natural insulation provided by their feathers is lost from
exposure to oil.131 The damage done to migrating birds by a single openair pit can be significant. In one study of bird mortality from open-air pits
in Wyoming, researchers noted eighty-one bird deaths from one open-air
pit over the course of one month.132
There is no exact count of the number of open-air pits currently
existing in the United States, but credible estimates put the number at
somewhere in the range of 400,000 to 600,000.133 If the owners of these
Migratory Bird Treaty Act: A Way Forward, 38 ENVTL. L. 1167, 1171 (2008) (noting that the
leading contributors to U.S. bird fatalities include collisions with buildings and automobiles and
predation by domestic and feral cats); See also COMM. ON ENVTL. IMPACTS OF WIND-ENERGY
PROJECTS, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, Environmental Impacts of Wind-Energy Projects 71–72 (2007)
(noting that millions of migratory birds doe each year from colliding with buildings, cars, and
airplanes).
129 The Service describes these open-air pits as “an earthen pit excavated adjacent to a drilling
rig . . . commonly used for the disposal of drilling muds and fluids in natural gas or oil fields.”
Reserve Pits: Mortality Risks to Birds, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Sept. 2009),
https://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/contaminants/documents/ReservePitsBirdMortality.pdf.
130 See PEDRO RAMIREZ, JR., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WILDLIFE MORTALITY RISK IN OIL
FIELD WASTE PITS (2000).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See, e.g., Pepper W. Trail, Avian Mortality at Oil Pits in the United States: A Review of the
Problem and Efforts for Its Solution, 543 ENVTL. MGMT. 543 (Nov. 2006) (estimating there were
approximately 500,000 open-air pits in the United States in 2006). The number of pits has increased
rapidly in the last decade with the development of the Bakken formation in North Dakota and
Montana. The ancient Bakken formation, which is estimated to contain between 10 to 500 billion
barrels of oil, was undevelopable until the late 2000s when oil and gas companies began using
horizontal drilling and fracking techniques to reach the deposits. See Krisztina Nadasdy, North
Dakota: Flipping the Bird at the Migratory Bird Treaty Act Since 2012, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
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open-air pits are not utilizing effective mitigation techniques to protect
migratory birds from harm, it stands to reason that several takes of
migratory birds in violation of the MBTA from exposure to these openair pits will have occurred in the time it takes to read this Article.
In his recent note in the George Washington Journal of Energy &
Environmental Law, Benjamin Pachito points out that there are three
mitigation techniques that are endorsed by the Service for use by oil and
gas producers to protect birds from injury and death caused by open-air
pits.134 They are (1) using a closed containment system rather than an
open-air pit, (2) eliminating open-air pits entirely or, alternatively,
keeping oil out of the open-air pits, and (3) using a netting system to cover
the open-air pit.135 However, as Pachito notes, most oil and gas producers
opt for the cheaper and far less effective “mitigation” measures in their
open-air pits of flagging, strobe lighting, and installing noisemakers and
metal reflectors.136 There is considerable doubt about whether these
measures in fact offer much mitigation at all. To wit, one large study of
bird mortality from open-air pits found that these lesser mitigation
measures have no impact on reducing bird deaths, effectively making
them non-mitigating mitigation measures.137
Given the clear evidence that migrating birds are being killed and
injured by exposure to open-air pits, that these injuries and deaths, while
unintentional, are (at least in portions of the United States) violations of
the MBTA and its strict liability regime, that the most commonly-used
mitigation measures at the open-air pits (e.g., flagging, lighting, noise,
and reflectors) are entirely ineffective at keeping migrating birds from
using these open-air pits, and that the Service has offered clear
instructions regarding effective mitigation techniques at open-air pits, a
person could reasonably ask why the solution to this problem isn’t staring
us in the face. Namely, requiring oil and gas producers to utilize these
proven mitigation techniques. After all, if existing open-air pits were
covered in netting, converted to closed containment systems, or

REV. 69 (2013). At the end of 2015, there were 10,372 oil-producing wells in the Bakken, up from
only 446 oil-producing wells at the beginning of 2008, when the current production boom in the
Bakken began. N.D. Monthly Bakken Oil Production Statistics, N.D. DEP’T OF MIN. RES.,
https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicalbakkenoilstats.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
134 Benjamin Pachito, Resolving the Migratory Bird Treaty Act Circuit Split: Support for a Strict
Liability Standard and Proposal for an Incidental Take Permit, 6 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. 56, 58 (2016).
135 Id. at 58; see also RAMIREZ, supra note 130, at 2.
136 Id.; see also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 122, at 1 (noting that mitigation
techniques such as flagging, strobe lights, metal reflectors and noisemakers are ineffective at
preventing bird mortalities in oil pits).
137 Trail, supra note 133, at 543.
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eliminated entirely, migrating birds would no longer be tempted to use
them as stopover sites.
Unfortunately for migrating birds, this solution, while eminently
reasonable in the abstract, is all but unworkable on the ground in the
fragmented regulatory framework governing open-air pits. As Pachito
points out, existing state (for open-air pits on private lands) and Bureau
of Land Management (“BLM”) regulations (for open-air pits on federal
lands) generally do not compel oil and gas producers to use proven
mitigation techniques to protect migratory birds.138 Rather, these state and
federal regulations generally recommend rather than require use of
proven mitigation techniques, or are entirely silent on the question.139 This
results in infrequent use of closed containment and other proven measures
to mitigate bird deaths at open-air pits as the vast majority of oil and gas
producers make the rational economic decision not to install the more
expensive equipment in the absence of regulations requiring it.140
b. The Current State of the Law
The Service has consistently taken the position that a “take” under the
MBTA includes any unpermitted anthropogenic bird death, regardless of
whether the act causing the death was directed at birds or intended by the
actor to result in the take.141 In May 2015, the Service published a notice
of intent to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement
under the National Environmental Policy Act to evaluate the potential
environmental impacts of a proposed rule for the issuance of incidental
take permits under the MBTA (“Incidental Take Notice” or “Notice”).142
The Service referred to its “longstanding position that the MBTA applies
to take that occurs incidental to, and which is not the purpose of, an
otherwise lawful activity” in the Incidental Take Notice.143 Later in the
Notice, however, the Service explicates its longstanding, self-imposed
practice of limiting misdemeanor enforcement actions under the MBTA
to a subset of violations and actors:
We note that should we develop a permit system authorizing and
limiting incidental take, we would not expect every person or business
Pachito, supra note 134, at 58–59.
Id.
140 Id.
141 See, e.g., Permits, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/
mbpermits/ActSummaries.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (The MBTA provides that it is unlawful
to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, possess, sell, purchase, barter, import, export, or transport any
migratory bird, or any part, nest, or egg or any such bird, unless authorized under a permit issued
by the Secretary of the Interior.).
142 80 Fed. Reg. 30,032 (May 26, 2015).
143 Id. at 30,034.
138
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that may incidentally take migratory birds to obtain a permit, nor would
we intend to expand our judicious use of our enforcement authority under
the MBTA. The Service focuses its enforcement efforts under the MBTA
on industries or activities that chronically kill birds and has historically
pursued criminal prosecution under the Act only after notifying an
industry of its concerns regarding avian mortality, working with the
industry to find solutions, and proactively educating industry about ways
to avoid or minimize take of migratory birds. Similarly, our permit
program, if implemented, will focus on industries and activities that
involve significant avian mortality and for which reasonable and effective
measures to avoid or minimize take exist.144
The Service’s explicit recognition in the Notice of its long-standing
“judicious” practice of limiting misdemeanor MBTA enforcement for
incidental takes to industrial actors responsible for large numbers of bird
deaths who have been forewarned by the Service of their violations and
have the ability to mitigate these takes did not satisfy some of the parties
who submitted comments on the proposed rule.145 Several public
comments received by the Service on the proposed rule questioned the
Service’s legal authority under the MBTA to make such a rule, arguing
that the premise upon which the proposed incidental take permit rule is
based—that the MBTA criminalizes incidental takes of migratory birds—
is faulty because the MBTA’s take prohibition extends only to acts
directed at birds.146 Therefore, according to this reasoning, the Service is
proposing to create a permitting regime for a class of activities and
industries over which it has no legal authority under the MBTA.
Some comments opposing the proposed action took pains to draw a
distinction between the Service’s authority under the Endangered Species
Act to issue incidental take permits for non-directed takes of listed
species incident to lawful industrial activities and its authority to do so
under the MBTA. An incidental take of a listed species under the ESA is
Id.
The Service received 147 public comments on the proposed rule during the notice and
comment period, which closed July 27, 2015. These comments can be found online at Migratory
Bird Permits: Environmental Impact Statement, 80 Fed. Reg. 30,032 (proposed May 26, 2015) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21) (comments entered to Docket No. FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0001),
http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0001.
146 See, e.g., National Mining Association, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule, Migratory Bird
Permits: Environmental Impact Statement, Docket No. FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0001 (July 27,
2015) ([T]he [Service] should not pursue a rulemaking which improperly assumes that the MBTA
covers incidental take and therefor authorizes the [Service] to regulate it . . . “); Wyoming Mining
Association, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule, Migratory Bird Permits: Environmental Impact
Statement, Docket No. FWS-HQ-MB-2014-0067-0001 (July 29, 2015) (“The Service has neither
the authority nor the manpower or budget to develop and implement a permitting program for
incidental take under MBTA.”).
144
145
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a take that is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an
otherwise lawful activity.”147 The comments point out that the 1982
amendments to the ESA that created the concept of an incidental take of
a listed species were based in part on the fact that an ESA “take” includes
activities that “harm” or “harass” wildlife.148 They argue that the use of
the word harm, which is defined in the ESA regulations as any act that
actually kills or injures wildlife, including habitat modification,149 and
harass, which means “an intentional or negligent act or omission which
creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife,”150 expanded the prohibited
conduct under the ESA beyond intentional acts directed at wildlife to
include non-directed acts that incidentally harm wildlife. The comments
contrast the ESA with the MBTA, which does not include harm or
harassment in its take definition and, outside of a limited exception for
military activities, has not been amended by Congress to expressly
include incidental conduct within its purview in its more than one
hundred year history.151 Rather, they argue, the Service’s definition of an
MBTA “take” in 50 C.F.R. 10.12, as well as the operative language of
the MBTA in Section 703(a), only prohibit conduct that is actively
directed at birds (“pursuing,” “hunting,” or “capturing”) and does not
include incidental takes of birds.152 In the words of one commenter, “[t]his
difference between the ESA and the MBTA is conclusive that Congress
knows how to prohibit incidental conduct when it chooses, but simply
chose not to do so in the MBTA, and reaffirmed that decision time and
again in subsequent amendments.”153 Many of these same arguments
against the applicability of the MBTA to incidental takes of birds formed
the basis of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Citgo Petroleum less than two
months later.
In Citgo Petroleum, the Fifth Circuit considered Citgo’s appeal of its
convictions in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas for
three misdemeanor violations of the MBTA for “taking and killing”
migratory birds.154 The district court fined Citgo $15,000 for each MBTA
violation.155 The MBTA convictions stemmed from the discovery of ten
migratory bird carcasses in two open-top oil tanks at a refinery owned by

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2012).
Id. § 1532(19).
149 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016).
150 Id.
151 National Mining Association, supra note 146.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841 (S.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d, 801
F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
155 Id.
147
148
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Citgo. The evidence presented at trial showed that the birds died from
landing in these tanks and drowning in the oil contained therein.156
Because the birds belonged to a species protected by the MBTA, the
government brought criminal misdemeanor charges against Citgo for
unlawfully taking and aiding and abetting the taking of migratory birds
under Section 707(a).157 At trial, Citgo did not dispute that the birds died
as a result of landing in its oil tanks, but contended that these deaths were
not “takings” within the meaning of the MBTA because they resulted
from the company’s lawful industrial operations that were in no way
directed at killing or injuring birds.158 According to Citgo, the MBTA
does not criminalize industrial activities “in which migratory birds are
unintentionally killed as a result of activity completely unrelated to
hunting, trapping, or poaching.”159 To find otherwise, it argued, would
extend the reach of the MBTA to non-directed industrial activities that
the Act’s drafters never intended to criminalize and would “yield absurd
results.”160 For its part, the Government asserted that because the MBTA
criminalizes the taking or killing of a migratory bird “at any time, by any
means or in any manner,” it applies to directed activities such as hunting
and poaching and to industrial non-directed activities by corporations that
incidentally result in the taking and killing of migratory birds.161
In considering the parties’ arguments, the district court surveyed cases
from federal courts across the country, acknowledging that there was a
significant split among the circuits on the question of whether
misdemeanor liability for takes of migratory birds under the MBTA is
limited to bird deaths resulting from activities that are directed at birds,
such as hunting and poaching, or extends to non-directed activities, such
as oil and gas production, that indirectly and unintentionally cause the
death of protected birds.162 Among the cases standing for the former
proposition discussed by the court were the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans,163 the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Newton County Wildlife Association v. United States Forest Service,164
and United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas L.P.,165 a federal district court
opinion out of the Eighth Circuit.

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. at 842.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 843.
952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997.
840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012).
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The plaintiffs in Seattle Audubon appealed the district court’s denial
of their request to enjoin timber sales in the Pacific Northwest that they
alleged would result in the taking and killing of northern spotted owls in
violation of the MBTA by destroying their habitat.166 The court affirmed
the district court’s holding that a take under the MBTA must involve
“physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers” that is
directed at birds.167 Because the habitat modification from logging that
plaintiff’s sought to enjoin was not directed at birds, and any bird deaths
resulting from that modification would be incidental to the main purpose
of the activity, the court held that these deaths cannot constitute a take
under the MBTA or its regulations.168
As further evidence that a take under the MBTA does not include bird
deaths from non-directed conduct such as habitat modification, the court
noted that the ESA’s “take” definition includes the verb “harm,” which
includes habitat modification or degradation, while the MBTA’s
definition of take does not.169 The court found this difference in
prohibitions between the acts to be “distinct and purposeful,” particularly
in light of the fact that Congress amended the MBTA in 1986, just a few
years after the ESA amendments adding incidental take, and did not add
harm to its take prohibition in those amendments.170
A timber sale and its potential to result in the “take” of a protected bird
was again at issue in Newton County, decided six years after Seattle
Audubon. In Newton County, a coalition of environmental groups brought
suit against the U.S. Forest Service seeking an injunction to stop proposed
timber sales that they alleged, and the Forest Service conceded, would
result in migratory bird deaths from logging activity.171 Plaintiffs
contended that these bird deaths would violate the MBTA’s “absolute
prohibition” against killing protected birds, regardless of the intent
behind the activity that caused the deaths.172 Citing with approval Seattle
Audubon, the Eighth Circuit refused to grant an injunction, holding that
Section 703(a)’s plain language only prohibits conduct directed at birds
and that it would “stretch this 1918 statute far beyond the bounds of
reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on conduct, such

Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 302.
Id.
168 Id. at 302 (“The statute and regulations promulgated under it make no mention of habitat
modification or destruction.”).
169 Id. (“Habitat destruction causes “harm” to the owls under the ESA but does not “take” them
within the meaning of the MBTA.”).
170 Id.
171 Newton Cty. Wildlife Assoc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d at 115.
172 Id.
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as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of migratory
birds.”173
Brigham Oil, decided just nine months before the district court’s
decision was handed down in Citgo, relied on the holding in Newton
County to find that the defendant oil and gas company did not violate the
MBTA when two mallard ducks were killed when they landed in one of
the company’s open-air oil reserve pits.174 The government charged
Brigham under Section 707(a) with two misdemeanor criminal violations
for taking migratory birds.175 The court began its analysis by noting that
the MBTA does not define what it means by the word “take” in Section
703(a), meaning the court must construe the term according to its
ordinary meaning.176 It found this ordinary meaning in the dictionary and
in the MBTA’s implementing regulations, both of which, according to
the court, limit a take to an affirmative act directed at birds and not
“accidental activity or the unintended results of other conduct.”177
Therefore, because it found that Brigham’s operation of its open-air oil
reserve pits was not an activity directed at birds, the fact that two birds
were killed as an unintended consequence of Brigham’s lawful operation
those pits did not constitute a taking under the MBTA.178 Echoing the
Newton County court, the Bingham Oil court found it “highly unlikely”
Congress intended to criminalize lawful industrial activity that indirectly
kills birds under the MBTA.179
In addition to considering these “limited reach” cases finding that
misdemeanor liability under the MBTA extended only to activities
directed at birds, the Citgo Petroleum district court also took note of a
line of “expansive scope” cases from other jurisdictions that extended
MBTA misdemeanor liability to activities that indirectly took birds.180
The “expansive scope” cases reviewed by the district court include the
Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. FMC Corporation,181 a case
from a Colorado federal district court, United States v. Moon Lake

173 Id. (“[W]e agree with the Ninth Circuit that the ambiguous terms “take” and “kill” in 16
U.S.C. § 703 mean ‘physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct which
was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1918.’”).
174 Brigham Oil, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
175 Id. at 1203.
176 Id. at 1208.
177 Id. at 1209.
178 Id. at 1211.
179 Id. at 1213.
180 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 843–44 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
181 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.1978).
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Electric Association, Inc.,182 and United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.183
from the Tenth Circuit.
The activity at issue in FMC was FMC’s manufacture of pesticides at
its plant in Middleport, New York.184 The manufacturing process created
large amounts of wastewater that FMC stored in a ten acre pond near to
the plant.185 Unbeknownst to FMC and despite its efforts to remove it
from the plant’s effluent, a toxic chemical from its manufacturing process
was seeping into the wastewater and contaminating the pond.186 Over the
course of several months in 1975, the pond attracted birds that attempted
to use it as a stopover site during migration.187 Almost 100 birds died from
being exposed to the chemicals in the water.188 Based on these deaths, the
department of justice brought a 36-count indictment against FMC for
taking migratory birds in violation of Section 703 of the MBTA.189 In its
defense, FMC argued that because it had no intention to kill the birds and
took no action directed at the birds in its industrial activities, it did not
“take” the birds within the meaning of the MBTA.190 After a jury trial,
FMC was found guilty on eighteen of the thirty-six misdemeanor
counts.191
On FMC’s appeal of its convictions, the Second Circuit framed the
legal issue before it as whether a conviction for a taking under the MBTA
requires that the activity that resulted in the taking was intentional.192 Or,
to put it another way, must the government prove intent to sustain a
criminal conviction under the MBTA? In considering this question, the
court expressed concern about endorsing a construction of the MBTA that
“would bring every killing within the statute, such as deaths caused by
automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modern office buildings or picture
windows in residential dwellings into which birds fly.”193 The court
opined that such an expansive reading of the criminal reach of the MBTA
would “offend reason and common sense.”194 In this case, however, the
court found a sufficient distinction between these everyday activities that
incidentally kills birds (e.g., driving a car or flying a plane), which it said
182
183
184
185
186
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188
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190
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should not trigger MBTA liability, and FMC’s “extrahazardous” activity
of manufacturing toxic pesticides and failing to keep them from entering
its wastewater pond to justify imposing strict liability on FMC under the
MBTA.195 In other words, because FMC “engaged in an activity involving
the manufacture of a highly toxic chemical; and . . . failed to prevent this
chemical from escaping into the pond and killing birds” the fact that it
did not intend to kill birds in its industrial activities was irrelevant to the
question of strict liability under the MBTA.196
More than twenty years after the Second Circuit’s decision in FMC, a
federal district court in Colorado again took up the issue of criminal
liability under the MBTA for the incidental take of protected birds from
industrial non-directed activities in Moon Lake.197 Defendant Moon Lake
Electric, an electrical distribution cooperative, supplied electricity to a
Colorado oil field using power lines strung across over 3000 poles.198
Because the area near the oil field was mostly treeless, several species of
MBTA-protected birds used Moon Lake’s power poles for perching,
roosting, and hunting.199 Over the course of a little more than two years,
thirty-eight of these birds were electrocuted to death while using Moon
Lake’s poles in this manner.200 In its action against Mood Lake for “taking
and killing” misdemeanor violations of the MBTA, the government
alleged that these deaths could have been avoided if Moon Lake had
installed inexpensive safety equipment on the poles.201
Moon Lake contended that these electrocutions did not violate the
MBTA because they did not arise from the kind of an intentionally
harmful conduct directed at birds, such as that “normally exhibited by
hunters and poachers,” that Congress intended to criminalize under the
MBTA.202 Because its conduct was unintentional and it undertook no
action directed at birds, Moon Lake argued that it lacked both the mens
rea (mental state) and actus reus (physical act) required for conviction
under the MBTA.203
In rejecting Moon Lake’s lack of mens rea defense, the court pointed
to the plain language of Sections 703 and 707(a) of the MBTA.204
According to the court, the plain wording of both sections make clear that
195
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a misdemeanor violation of the Act is a strict liability crime and,
therefore, does not require proof of intent to take a bird to sustain a
conviction.205 To further support this view, the court pointed to
Congress’s statement in its amendment adding a mens rea requirement
for felonies under Section 707(b) of the Act that “[n]othing in this
amendment is intended to alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for
misdemeanor
prosecutions
under
16
U.S.C.
§ 707(a).”206 Therefore, the court held that Moon Lake’s intent to take the
birds, or lack thereof, was “irrelevant to its prosecution under § 707(a).”207
The court next took up Moon Lake’s argument that it lacked the
requisite actus reus to support a misdemeanor conviction under Section
707(a), because it took no action directed at taking the birds. The court
noted that while some of the types of prohibited conduct enumerated in
the statute and its implementing regulations (hunting, capturing,
shooting, and trapping) could be construed as applying solely to hunters
and poachers, the inclusion of the word “killing” shows that “Congress
intended to prohibit conduct beyond that normally exhibited by hunters
and poachers.”208 The court was also not persuaded by Moon Lake’s
reliance on Seattle Audubon and Newton County as support for its
contention that the MBTA’s reach is limited to takings associated with
hunting and poaching.209 The court found both cases inapposite to the
conduct at issue because they dealt with plaintiffs seeking injunctions to
stop timber sales that could lead to habitat modification or destruction
that might result in the taking of migratory birds.210 Comparing the
somewhat tortured causal chain presented in those cases to the more
proximate link between Moon Lake’s activity in this case and the killing
of birds, the district court held that the government had met its burden of
proving proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt under Section 707(a)
because the evidence showed that Moon Lake was aware of the danger to
birds posed by its activities prior to the killings at issue in the case and
failed to take the relatively inexpensive measures required to ameliorate
it.211 In explaining what it meant by proximate cause in this context, the
court cited the definition provided in Black’s Law Dictionary: “that
which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
205 Id. (“Simply stated, then, it is not necessary to prove that a defendant violated the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act with specific intent or guilty knowledge.”).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 1074.
208 Id. (“If Congress intended to proscribe only capture, injury, and deaths that occur as a result
conduct associated with hunting or poaching, Congress could have said so.”).
209 Id. at 1075.
210 Id. at 1076–77.
211 Id. at 1085.
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intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the accident
could not have happened, if the injury be one which might be reasonably
anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence of the wrongful act.”212
The Moon Lake court was the first federal court to suggest that
misdemeanor liability under Section 707(a)—which the court itself
characterized as a strict liability crime that applied to activities beyond
hunting and poaching—was nevertheless limited to situations where the
alleged violator reasonably anticipated or foresaw the bird deaths as a
natural consequence of its act.213 Given its expansive view of the scope of
the Act, the court believed this proximate cause limitation was necessary
to avoid “absurd results” under the MBTA in the form of criminal
prosecutions for bird deaths caused by everyday activities.214
Because the death of a protected bird is generally not a probable
consequence of driving an automobile, piloting an airplane, maintaining
an office building, or living in a residential dwelling with a picture
window, such activities would not normally result in liability under §
707(a), even if such activities would cause the death of protected birds.215
The court opined that this proximate cause limitation was preferable to
relying on prosecutorial discretion to “ensure [the MBTA] does not
ensnare those beyond its proper confines.”216
The Tenth Circuit endorsed the Moon Lake court’s expansive scope
limited by proximate cause view of MBTA misdemeanor liability for
incidental takes in Apollo Energies,217 decided more than a decade later.
The defendants in Apollo Energies, Apollo Energies, Inc. (“Apollo”) and
Dale Walker (doing business as Red Cedar Oil) (“Walker”), were
commercial oil field operators in Kansas that used a device at their well
sites called a “heater-treater” to separate water and other contaminants
from the produced oil.218 The heater-treaters at issue were metal cylinders
twenty feet high and more than three feet wide, with vertical exhaust
pipes and movable louvres at the base. Birds were drawn to the heatertreaters as nest sites, but became stuck when they entered through the
exhaust pipe or louvres.219 Working off an anonymous tip, in December
2005, the Service inspected hundreds of heater-treaters in the area and
discovered the carcasses of over 300 birds trapped inside, including ten
Id.; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th ed.1990).
45 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
214 Id. at 1084.
215 Id.
216 Id. (“While prosecutors necessarily enjoy much discretion, proper construction of a criminal
statute cannot depend upon the good will of those who must enforce it.”).
217 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 682 (10th Cir. 2010).
218 Id.
219 Id.
212
213
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protected birds.220 None of these protected bird carcasses were found in
heater-treaters belonging to Walker or Apollo.221
Rather than immediately recommending that the offending oil field
operators be charged with violating the MBTA, the Service decided to
give all operators in the area a grace period of one year and undertook a
campaign to educate the companies about the heater-treater problem.222
The Service’s education campaign included sending letters describing the
problem to oil companies in the area, including Apollo.223 The evidence
at trial showed that Walker did not receive a letter at this time.224 In April
2007, after the grace period ended, the Service again inspected the heatertreaters. A carcass of a Northern Flicker, an MBTA-protected species,
was found inside one of Apollo’s heater-treaters, and four carcasses of
protected birds were discovered in Walker’s heater-treaters.225 At this
point the Service sent Walker the educational letter.226 Another carcass
was found in one of Walker’s heater-treaters when the service performed
a subsequent search in 2008.227 At trial, Apollo was convicted of one
misdemeanor violation of the MBTA for the carcass discovered in 2007
and Walker was convicted of two misdemeanor violations, one for the
carcasses discovered in 2007 before it received the warning letter and one
for carcass discovered in 2008 after the letter was received.228 Citing
Moon Lake, the lower court based its decision on its finding that
defendants’ failures to bird-proof their heater-treaters proximately caused
the bird deaths they were accused of, because these deaths were a
reasonably anticipated or foreseeable consequence of these failures to
act.229
In their appeal to the Tenth Circuit, defendants argued that the
convictions should be overturned because they had no intent to take the
protected birds and, even if the court finds that violations of Section 703
are strict liability crimes, the application of the Act was unconstitutional
as to their conduct because they were deprived of due process.230 This due
process argument rested on defendants’ contention that because the
MBTA criminalizes acts that are “several steps removed from bird deaths
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or takings,” a reasonable actor has no notice that its otherwise legal and
non-bird directed acts could give rise to criminal liability.231
The court made quick work of defendants’ mens rea argument, relying
on its earlier decision in United States v. Corrow232 to hold that
misdemeanor violations of the MBTA are strict liability crimes and,
therefore the fact that defendants did not intend to take the birds was
irrelevant.233 However, echoing the Moon Lake decision, the court went
on to hold that strict liability under the MBTA satisfies due process only
if the accused proximately caused harm to protected birds.234 In other
words, when the defendant’s predicate acts that led to the alleged
violation of the Act are “commonly and ordinarily not criminal” (e.g.,
lawful industrial operations that are not directed at harming birds),
proximate causation necessary for a criminal conviction under Section
703(a) requires that defendant was on notice that these predicate acts
could result in a violation of the Act.235 Based on this reasoning, the court
upheld Apollo’s single conviction and Walker’s conviction for the 2008
violation, because both occurred after the respective parties received
warning letters from the Service notifying them that their operations
could result in the death of protected birds, and reversed Walker’s
conviction for the 2007 violation that occurred before he received the
letter.236
After reviewing both the “limited reach” and “expansive scope” cases
discussed above and acknowledging that the issue of MBTA
misdemeanor liability for indirect harm to protected birds by lawful
industrial operations was an issue of first impression in the Fifth Circuit,
the Citgo Petroleum district court opted to follow the Moon Lake and
Apollo Energies strict liability tempered by proximate cause approach to
this issue:
The Court further adopts the Tenth Circuit’s opinion that “a strict
liability interpretation of the MBTA for the conduct charged here satisfies
due process only if defendants proximately caused the harm to protected
birds.” Thus, the Court must determine whether it was reasonably
foreseeable that CITGO’s operation of open-air tanks would result in bird
deaths.237

Id. at 689.
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In determining that Citgo violated the Act by proximately causing the
taking of protected birds, the court placed great emphasis on Citgo’s
failure to install roofs on its oil reserve tanks even after it was aware of
the danger these tanks posed to birds.238 There was ample evidence
introduced at trial showing that Citgo had known for at least a decade
prior to the bird deaths at issue in the trial that protected birds were dying
it its open-air tanks.239 Based on this evidence, the court held that it was
reasonably foreseeable to Citgo that its operations could result in the
deaths of protected birds, that Citgo had done nothing to mitigate this
risk, and that these operations had in fact proximately caused the taking
of migratory birds in violation of Section 703 of the MBTA.240
Citgo’s appeal of its MBTA conviction reached the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in 2015. Reviewing Citgo’s MBTA conviction de novo, the
appellate court began its opinion by applauding the district courts for its
thorough review of the case law on MBTA misdemeanor liability in
reaching its holding that an illegal “taking” under the MBTA is a strict
liability crime that applies both to activities directed at birds, such as
hunting and poaching, and non-directed industrial activities that
proximately cause the death of a protected bird.241 Its appreciation for the
lower court’s diligence notwithstanding, however, the Fifth Circuit
wasted little time in rejecting the lower court’s expanded scope holding
(and the rationale behind it borrowed from the Tenth Circuit’s Apollo
Energies decision), opting instead to follow the limited reach decisions
in Newton County and Seattle Audubon to reverse Citgo’s MBTA
convictions:
[W]e agree with the Eighth and Ninth circuits that a “taking” is
limited to deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to
migratory birds. Our conclusion is based on the [MBTA’s] text,
its common law origin, a comparison with other relevant statutes,
and rejection of the argument that strict liability can change the
nature of the necessary legal act.242

The court emphasized that because Citgo was accused of “taking”
protected birds, not of “killing” them, it would confine its analysis to
determining what is meant by this term in Section 703(a) and the
implementing regulations.243 The court agreed with the government that
a Section 703(a) taking is a strict liability crime that does not require
Id. at 848.
Id. (“The evidence presented at trial established that a number of individuals saw oil-covered
birds—both dead and alive—inside Tanks 116 and 117 as early as 1997.”).
240 Id.
241 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 2015).
242 Id. at 488–89.
243 Id. at 489.
238
239
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proof that defendant intended to cause injury to a protected bird to support
a misdemeanor conviction.244 But it disagreed that the absence of a mens
rea requirement for takings means that even acts that indirectly or
accidentally kill birds are “takes” under the Act.245 According to the Fifth
Circuit, while the strict liability nature takings under Act means the
government need not prove the defendant had criminal intent in taking a
protected bird, it does not relieve it of the obligation to prove that
defendant undertook an affirmative act to cause migratory bird deaths.246
The court found compelling support for an actus reus requirement that
limits the reach of the MBTA’s taking prohibition to activities
intentionally directed at migratory birds in its view that the common law
definition of the word “take” at the time the Act was passed assumed an
affirmative act of reducing an animal to human control, which, according
to the court, cannot be done accidentally or by omission.247 Echoing the
Ninth Circuit in Seattle Audubon, the court bolstered this restrictive
interpretation by comparing the MBTA’s definition of “take,” which does
not include the concepts of harm or harassment, with the Endangered
Species Act’s expansive definition of the concept, which does.248
In the Fifth Circuit’s view, the fact that Congress modified the
common law definition of “take” in the ESA to include indirect injury to
animals by “harming” or “harassing” them, but has not similarly
expanded the MBTA’s take prohibition to cover non-intentional acts,
supports its reading that an MBTA “take” retains its common law
meaning and applies only to act directed at protected birds.249 The court
further found that Section 703(a)’s criminalizing of pursuing, hunting,
taking, capturing or killing a protected bird “at any time, by any means,
in any manner” does not expand its scope to cover non-directed activities,
but merely modifies the mode of the prohibited “deliberately conducted
activity.”250 Therefore, the court held, while it is undisputed that MBTA
protected birds died from landing in Citgo’s uncovered oil tanks, Citgo
did not “take” the birds in violation of the MBTA because its operation
of these tanks was not intentionally directed at migratory birds.251

Id. at 492.
Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 489 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 717
(1995) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
248 Id. at 490.
249 Id.
250 Id. (“For instance, the manner and means of hunting may differ from bowhunting to rifles,
shotguns, and air rifles, but hunting is still a deliberately conducted activity.”).
251 Id. at 494.
244
245
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The Fifth Circuits decision in Citgo Petroleum, the latest judicial word
on the applicability of the MBTA to bird deaths arising out of industrial
non-directed activities, hardened the existing circuit split on this question.
Thus, while it provided assurance to industrial operators that they have
nothing to fear from the MBTA if their facilities located within the
boundaries of the Fifth Circuit kill protected birds, this certainty is
necessarily limited to these judicial boundaries. A solution with national
application that will resolve the MBTA liability uncertainty plaguing
companies with industrial operations in locations across the country
remains elusive.
2. Nonindustrial Non-Directed Activities
a. The Activity (the “Cute Kitten”)
In May 2014 Ernesto Pulido, a local landscaper, was hired by the U.S.
Postal Service to trim several ficus trees outside a post office in Oakland,
California, because birds nesting in the trees had been defecating on mail
trucks parked underneath them.252 As a result of Mr. Pulido’s trimming
work, five baby black-crowned night herons were dislodged from their
nests and injured when they impacted the ground.253 The public outcry in
Oakland was immediate and intense. Mr. Pulido was forced to move to
another residence in the city because of threats he received from enraged
bird lovers.254 Fortunately none of the baby birds were grievously injured
and all eventually made a full recovery under the care of the International
Bird Rescue Center in Solano County, California.255
Facing public pressure, the Service opened an investigation into the
incident as a possible violation of the MBTA. At the close of the
investigation the Service recommended that Pulido be charged with a
misdemeanor violation under Section 707(a) of the MBTA and face a
civil penalty of $1,500.256 This recommendation triggered another outcry;
this time directed not at Mr. Pulido but at what California Congressman
Darrell Issa called “bureaucratic bullying” by the Service in a letter he
wrote to the Service in his capacity as Chairman of the House of

252 Carol Pogash, Birds Leave Nest Involuntarily, and Oakland Fumes, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/us/after-fall-ruffled-feathers-for-5-birds-andoakland.html.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
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Representative’s Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
decrying the recommendation to charge Pulido.257
Shortly after receiving Congressman Issa’s letter, the Service and the
U.S. Attorney’s office jointly announced that they had decided not to
pursue MBTA charges against Pulido for the incident.258 Congressman
Issa immediately lauded the decision not to prosecute in a press release:
I’m glad to hear that in the case of Mr. Pulido, the bureaucratic
bullies have backed down. The decision to press charges in the
first place seems to have been based more on public outcry from
outside groups and less on common sense. Mr. Pulido made a
mistake, but took responsibility and made substantial efforts to
make amends. The Committee still has unanswered questions
about this entire head-scratching incident and looks forward to
hearing directly from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which
must still comply with the Committee’s document request.259

b. The Current State of the Law
The threatened but ultimately abandoned MBTA prosecution of Ernest
Pulido surprised many observers, but perhaps not for the reason one
might imagine. The surprising thing about the episode was not that the
Service ultimately backed down, but that it recommended prosecution in
the first place. The Service attributes an astonishing 2.4 billion migratory
bird deaths each year to the predations of housecats.260 While less lethal
than cats in terms of absolute numbers, collisions with airplanes and
automobiles kill hundreds of millions of migratory birds each year.261
While these nonindustrial non-directed causes of migratory bird mortality
are orders of magnitude more damaging to migratory birds than industrial
and nonindustrial directed activities and industrial non-directed activities,
which combined account for a comparatively paltry 50 million bird
deaths annually,262 they never result in MBTA prosecutions. This lack of
257 Letter to Honorable Daniel M. Ashe, Director, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (May 28, 2014),
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/2014-05-28-DEI-to-Ashe-FWS-MBTAProsecution.pdf.
258 Veronica Rocha, No charges for Oakland tree trimmer accused of injuring heron chicks,
L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-no-federal-chargesoakland-trimmer-herons-20140606-story.html.
259 Press Release, Congressman Daniel Issa, Issa Statement on Agency Dropping Charges
Against Calif. Tree-Trimmer (June 4, 2016), http://issa.house.gov/press-releases/2014/06/issastatement-on-agency-dropping-charges-against-calif-tree-trimmer/.
260 See Threats to Birds: Migratory Bird Mortality – Questions and Answers, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/birds/bird-enthusiasts/threats-to-birds.php (last visited
Mar. 22, 2017.
261 Id. (estimating 200 million annual migratory bird deaths from colliding with automobiles).
262 Id.
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enforcement cannot be attributed to a carve-out in the Act for bird deaths
from these everyday activities; the statute and its implementing
regulations offer no such safe harbor. Rather, the Service and Department
of Justice exercise their prosecutorial discretion in refraining from
prosecuting individuals for non-directed takings of protected birds.263
This exercise of discretion is longstanding and uniform throughout the
country. The author could not find a single example in the long history of
the MBTA of an individual being prosecuted for killing a protected bird
while engaged in a nonindustrial non-directed activity, such as driving a
car or owning a predatory housecat.
3. The Proposed Approach
It would be putting it kindly to say that courts have struggled to
articulate a consistent and statutorily defensible rationale for imposing
(or not imposing) misdemeanor MBTA liability on activities outside of
hunting and poaching that kill protected birds. That this foundational
question about the Act’s scope remains in doubt even as it enters its
second century of existence is equal parts astonishing and frustrating.
While it is tempting (and perhaps accurate) to place the lion’s share of
the blame for this ongoing uncertainty on Congress and the Department
of Interior, which have mostly failed for a century to add “flesh” to the
skeletal outline of MBTA in the form of clarifying legislation or
regulations,264 the Supreme Court bears its share of responsibility for
allowing a decades-long circuit split to fester unresolved. The unhappy
result of this legislative, administrative, and judicial inaction is felt most
keenly by the industries whose activities incidentally kill birds. For them,
the question of whether they have violated the Act when a protected bird
dies from their industrial operations is anything but straightforward;
depending as it does both on the law applicable to the part of the country
where those operations are located and on the Service’s unpredictable and
uneven enforcement of the Act.
The current confused status of the law around misdemeanor violations
of the MBTA for industrial non-directed activities is untenable. On the
one hand, in large parts of the country the Act’s reach has been so
circumscribed by judicial interpretation that it effectively has no role to
263 See Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 80 Fed.
Reg. 30,002, 30,032 (May 26, 2015) (noting the Service’s “judicious use” of its MBTA
enforcement authority).
264 See Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal
Enforcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 359,
370 (1999) (describing the MBTA as “a skeleton upon which the implementing regulations
necessarily place the flesh.”).
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play in regulating industrial causes of bird mortality outside of hunting
and poaching.265 This attenuation of the MBTA’s scope contravenes a
plain reading of its language and implementing regulations, compelling
legislative history showing that the law’s drafters meant to protect birds
from multifarious harms, and the broad conservational spirit animating
the several treaties it implements. On the other hand, even those few
circuits that have taken a more expansive view of the Act’s reach into
industrial non-directed activities have inappropriately cabined their
holdings with a proximate cause requirement that makes no sense with
the Act’s clear strict liability language266 or added a nonsensical, tortbased restriction limiting the Act’s reach to only “extrahazardous”
industrial activities; a limitation that finds no support in the Act or the
treaties it implements.267 And, finally, there are the several circuits that
have yet to rule on this question at all, creating more regulatory and legal
uncertainty for industrial operators whose activities incidentally take
protected birds.
This uncertainly is felt most acutely by companies with industrial
facilities in different parts of the country. For these businesses, whether
or not they risk criminal liability under the MBTA should a protected bird
be killed as an incidental consequence of operating these facilities
depends almost entirely on where in the country the facilities are located.
For example, consider the situation of an oil company that has drilling
operations with open-air oil and wastewater pits in multiple locations
across the country. After Citgo, the company can rest easy that any birds
that die when they land in its pits located in Texas, Louisiana, and
Mississippi (the states making up the Fifth Circuit) will not trigger
MBTA liability. But the same company also knows, based on the Tenth
Circuit’s Apollo Energies decision, that it faces potential MBTA liability
if the same thing happens in any pits it operates in Oklahoma, Utah, New
Mexico, Colorado, Kansas or Wyoming, provided those operations are
found to have proximately caused the bird deaths. The same would be
true for a bird take by open-air pits in New York, Vermont, and
Connecticut, without the proximate cause limitation, but only if these
operations are “extrahazardous” within the meaning of the Second
Circuit’s holding in FMC. If the company has any pits in states within the
Eighth or Ninth Circuits, including states such as Alaska, Montana, and
South Dakota with significant natural resource extraction activities, it
265 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015); Newton Cty. Wildlife
Assoc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952
F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
266 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
267 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.1978).
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may take some solace in the Newton County and Seattle Audubon
decisions that share the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive view that an MBTA
“take” only applies to conduct directed at a bird. But the company would
also understand that those cases dealt with timber sales that might result
in birds dying, not bird deaths caused by industrial operations, and
therefore may not insulate it from MBTA liability. And, to confuse
matters even more, any bird deaths caused by pits operated in North
Dakota, located within the Eighth Circuit, may be treated as they would
be in the Fifth Circuit, based on the district court’s holding in Bingham
Oil that the MBTA does not apply to incidental takes by industrial
operations. And, finally, if any birds are killed by industrial operations in
any of the twenty-two states outside the boundaries of Second, Fifth,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the company can only guess as to its
potential MBTA liability. It is, in short, a confusing and comprehensive
mess that is antithetical to the nation-wide regulatory and legal certainty
that federal laws are supposed to supply. This situation can also
inadvertently and inappropriately put a regulatory thumb on the scale that
favors one state over another when large industrial operators are
considering locations for new industrial facilities.
Resolving the uncertainty caused by the circuit split about
misdemeanor liability for bird kills from industrial non-directed activities
and the continuing question about the applicability of the MBTA to
nonindustrial non-directed activities will require action either by the
Supreme Court or by the Service and Congress. For the reasons discussed
below, the latter option is preferred.
a. Judicial Resolution
While it is possible that the Supreme Court will someday break its
century-long silence on the scope of misdemeanor liability under the
MBTA by granting certiorari to hear a case on point, there are no present
indications that the Court intends to do so, nor would any such resolution
arise from the Court taking up the Fifth Circuit’s Citgo Petroleum
decision.268 Shortly after the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in Citgo
Petroleum the court granted the United States an extension of time to file
a petition for rehearing, giving the government until October 16, 2015 to
file.269 However, no petition was submitted to the court by this date and

268 See Robbins, supra note 82, at 598 (pointing out that the U.S. Supreme Court has never dealt
with the reach of MBTA liability, which has left it to the federal district and appellate courts to
wrestle with the issue without guidance).
269 Order Granting Extension of Time to File, United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 1440128 (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2015).
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the mandate was issued on October 19, 2015.270 The United States did not
petition the Supreme Court for a writ for certiorari following the issuance
of the mandate, effectively ending the case.
Even if the Supreme Court were to agree to consider such a case,
however, it is likely that its resolution of this question would be as
unsatisfactory as that offered by several circuit court opinions discussed
in this article. Like them, the Supreme Court would have to contend with
applying the skeletal language of the MBTA to contemporary industrial
activities that bear little resemblance to those in existence in the early
20th Century when the MBTA became law. And, like the circuit courts
before it, the Court would have to do so in the absence of regulations that
could provide useful guidance from the Service as to what it views as the
appropriate role of the MBTA in regulating incidental takes of protected
birds by industrial and nonindustrial activities.
The most likely result of this hypothetical case would either be the
Supreme Court adopting a Fifth Circuit-style limited reach approach that,
outside of unpermitted takes by hunters and poachers, exempts all
anthropogenic causes of bird mortality from criminal liability under the
MBTA, including industrial non-directed takes; or adopting the Second
and Tenth Circuit’s more expansive view of MBTA misdemeanor
liability for industrial actors that nevertheless relies on artificial
limitations of proximate cause or extra hazardous behavior to avoid the
“absurd result” of criminalizing bird deaths resulting from everyday
activities under the Act. Neither one of these likely results would be
desirable. What’s more, in either scenario, the applicability of the MBTA
to bird deaths from nonindustrial every day activities, such as driving a
car, would not be directly at issue in the case and would therefore be
unlikely to receive the consideration and clarification it merits. A better
and more satisfying approach to resolving this uncertainty would come
from Congress and the Service.
b. Legislative and Administrative Resolution
First, it is necessary to acknowledge that this article is being written in
a time of congressional gridlock.271 The phrase “do nothing Congress,”
first coined by President Truman in 1948 in reaction to the 80th
270 See Judgment Issued as the Mandate, United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. 14-40128
(5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2015).
271 See Aaron Blake, Gridlock in Congress? It’s probably even worse than you think, WASH.
POST, May 29, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/05/29/gridlock-incongress-its-probably-even-worse-than-you-think/ (noting that the number of bills passed by
Congress has dropped by more than half over the last several decades, and that “[f[ully 75 percent
of salient issues today are in gridlock.”).
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Congress’s extreme legislative lethargy, has been revived in recent years
as an apt descriptor for the 114th Congress and its inability or
unwillingness to pass legislation.272 Be that as it may, however, the best
approach to clarify the scope of misdemeanor liability under the MBTA
involves legislative amendments to the MBTA, coupled with an
administrative rulemaking. So, with the hopeful observation that even the
worst rush hour traffic jams eventually clear, this article proposes a set of
legislative and administrative fixes to the MBTA liability quagmire.
Some courts and commentators have argued against criminalizing
incidental takes of migratory birds by industrial activities by pointing to
the fact that a primary motivation for the creation of the Canada Treaty
and the passage of the MBTA implementing it was the decimation of bird
species such as the passenger pigeon by hunters and poachers.273 These
commentators reason that the Act’s original focus on the directed
activities of hunting and poaching should be treated as a jurisdictional
limitation on the scope of the MBTA, even one hundred years after the
law was passed when the threats to birds include industrial activities that
the law’s drafters could not have imagined. There are several problems
with this argument. First, it conveniently ignores the unfriendly fact that
the extinction of the passenger pigeon and other migratory birds was
primarily caused not by weekend hunters taking more than their fair share
of game, but by professional hunters acting in response to the demands
of a market that paid them handsomely for supplying that demand. In
other words, a market hunting industry that existed to supply the millinery
industry’s need for bird feathers to adorn women’s hats. That this
commercially-driven, industrial-grade slaughter of birds, not the
predations of weekend hunters, was behind the passage of the MBTA
undermines the “originalist” argument to limit its present-day application
to nonindustrial actors such as hunters and poachers, and supports a more
expansive view of potential liability under the law that nevertheless
avoids criminalizing bird deaths from everyday activities.
A second, related problem with this argument is that it relies on the
fact that hunters kill birds by deliberately and intentionally firing
projectiles at them to conclude that misdemeanor liability under the
MBTA should attach only to the small number of human endeavors
272 STEVE NEAL, MIRACLE OF ‘48: HARRY TRUMAN’S MAJOR CAMPAIGN SPEECHES AND
WHISTLE-STOPS 122 (2003).
273 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d at 302 (limiting an MBTA “take” to
“physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly
a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment in 1918.”); Benjamin Means, Prohibiting Conduct,
Not Consequences: The Limited Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823,
833 (1998) (“That the MBTA prohibits pursuing, hunting, capturing, and the like strongly suggests
that Congress intended to restrict only activity directed at migratory birds.”).
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where the killing of protected birds is the intended result of the activity.
In other words, so this thinking goes, as long as killing birds is not the
intended outcome of an activity, the actor should not face liability under
the MBTA for any bird deaths, no matter how numerous, resulting from
it. This argument rests on a misapprehension about what Congress was
trying to accomplish in the MBTA. The MBTA was not intended to
simply be a piece of anti-hunting legislation. To the contrary, it expressly
allows the continued hunting of birds within reasonable time, place, and
manner limitations. Rather, the legislative history of the Act clearly
shows that the drafters’ focus was on protecting migratory birds from
current and future threats to their survival so that they could continue to
provide aesthetic, nutritional, recreational, and agricultural benefits to
people into the future.
This broad conservational goal explains why the MBTA does not
require mens rea for a criminal conviction for taking or killing a bird.
Whether or not a person or company intended to kill a protected bird by
their activity is not the point. The point is that a protected bird has been
killed, which necessarily negatively impacts, even if remotely, its
species’ continued survival. Similarly, it explains why the instrument of
the bird’s death, be it shotgun or uncovered oil and wastewater pit, is of
no import under the Act. Both of these manmade objects (and many
others) are lethal to migratory birds and, therefore, both must be included
within the ambit of the broad protections afforded to certain species of
migratory birds by the MBTA if it is to serve its intended conservational
purpose. But it is equally the case that there are significant societal
benefits, be they purely recreational, purely economic, or some mixture
of the two, that come from both; benefits few would argue should be
entirely disregarded simply because they result in bird deaths. An
appropriate balance must be struck that allows these activities to continue
subject to reasonable regulations to ensure they do not threaten the
survival of entire species of migratory birds. Most observers would agree
that just such a balance exists under the MBTA for industrial and
nonindustrial directed activities. While, as discussed elsewhere in this
article, a plain reading of Section 703(a) appears to criminalize any
activity, including hunting, that causes the death of a protected bird,
regardless of intent, other provisions in the Act, the Service’s
implementing regulations, and complementary state laws and regulations
allow hunters to take protected birds within prescribed time, place, and
manner limitations. The result is a workable and easily understood
regulatory framework that allows this important activity to continue
while protecting fragile bird populations from overharvesting.
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Unfortunately, and this is the root of the problem that has led to the
circuit split, while the MBTA also plainly criminalizes bird deaths from
industrial non-directed activities in Section 703(a),274 neither it nor the
statute’s implementing regulations balance this facial blanket prohibition
with rules that exempt companies from liability under the Act for certain
preauthorized incidental takes of birds from their industrial activities.
That this balance was not struck in the original incarnation of the MBTA
is not particularly surprising. Most of today’s biggest industrial threats to
birds (wind turbines, cell towers, open-air oil and gas wastewater pits)
either did not exist in 1918 or, if they did, their deleterious impact on
birds was not well understood. The only industry that had Congress’s
attention at that time was the market hunting industry, and it provided a
balanced approach for containing its impact on migratory birds, as
discussed above. What is surprising is that Congress has not amended the
MBTA in the last 100 years to address this obvious deficiency, and that
it took the Service until 2015 to begin to officially explore the possibility
of creating an incidental take permitting scheme for industrial activities
under the MBTA.275 This nearly century-long legislative and
administrative silence on this critical question about the scope of the
MBTA has persisted even as industrial development boomed in America
and hundreds of millions of migratory birds were electrocuted, drowned,
and smashed as a result. It is little wonder then that the court system,
which does not have the option of staying silent when the rare MBTA
case for an incidental take comes before it, has struggled to fill this legal
and regulatory vacuum. The resulting uneven, confusing, and
contradictory body of case law on MBTA incidental takes has led many
industries to view the MBTA as a sword of Damocles hovering over their
otherwise lawful commercial activities.276 Similarly, noncommercial
actors—automobile drivers, cat owners, house dwellers—are not
expressly absolved of potential liability under the MBTA for incidental
bird kills caused by their actions, even though it is clear that these
everyday activities are not now and have never been the intended targets
of the Act, and must instead rely on the discretion of government lawyers
not to bring charges against them. The time has come for Congress to step
274 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012) (“[I]t shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any
manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill . . . any migratory bird .
. [.]”).
275 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 80 Fed. Reg.
30,032 (May 26, 2015).
276 See John Arnold McKinsey, Regulating Avian Impacts Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
and Other Laws: The Wind Industry Collides with One of its Own, the Environmental Protection
Movement, 28 ENERGY L.J. 71, 78 (2007) (noting that the wind energy industry has suffered from
not knowing whether the MBTA would be enforced against wind projects that kill birds).
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in to resolve these uncertainties. To that end, Congress should take the
following actions:
(1) Amend Section 703(a) of the MBTA to clarify that bird deaths from
industrial non-directed activities are strict liability misdemeanor crimes
under the Act. Resolving the longstanding uncertainty about whether
MBTA misdemeanor liability should attach to incidental takes of
protected birds by industrial activities can be accomplished by adding the
following italicized language to Section 703(a):
(a) Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means
or in any manner, including, without limitation, constructing, operating,
or deconstructing industrial facilities as part of a commercial enterprise,
to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill . . . any
migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product,
whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or
part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof . . . [.]
Amending Section 703(a) to specifically include industrial nondirected activities is consistent both with the MBTA’s overarching
purpose to protect selected species of migratory birds from the deleterious
impacts of human activities that threaten their survival, without regard to
the intent behind those activities, and with the law’s creation in response
to the industrial slaughter of birds by commercial hunters. Modern
industrial threats to the survival of migratory birds extend well beyond
hunting and poaching. Thus, in order to remain relevant in the 21st
Century, the law should be amended to explicitly include these modern
industrial activities within its ambit.
Making this addition to Section 703 does not require any amendment
to the current regulatory definition of “take” as pursuing, hunting,
shooting, wounding, killing, trapping, capturing, or collecting a
migratory bird.277 The specific injuries that industrial facilities cause to
migratory birds, and which the MBTA was created to address, are
adequately captured by the verbs “kill” and “wound” in the take
definition. In other words, with the suggested amendment to Section 703,
if a migratory bird is killed or wounded by, for example, landing in an oil
company’s uncovered oil and wastewater pit and the company is indicted
by the Service for taking the bird, the only question at trial should be one
of proof that the alleged taking occurred, not whether the MBTA applies
to incidental takes by industrial non-directed activities.
(2) Authorize the Department of Interior to develop an MBTA
incidental take permit system for incidental takes of migratory birds by
277

50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2016).
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industrial non-directed activities. The suggested revision to Section
703(a) resolves the vexing question of whether the MBTA applies to
incidental takes by industrial activities, but it does not provide the safe
harbor for incidental takes by industry that is currently available to
hunters and other direct actors under the MBTA and its implementing
regulations. The rules allowing hunters to take birds without liability as
long as they do so in accordance with bag limits, open and close seasons,
and other similar restrictions are compatible with the terms of the Canada,
Mexico, Japan, and Russia Treaties and the terms of the MBTA, which
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations
allowing for the take of migratory birds so long as they are compatible
with the conservation purposes of the treaties.278 The Secretary,
recognizing both the significant recreational value provided by bird
hunting and its potential to wreak havoc on bird populations if left
unchecked, struck a workable balance between the two with its time,
place, and manner hunting regulations.
A similar scheme is required for bird takes from industrial non-directed
activities; one that balances the economic necessity for continued
industrial development, even when that development incidentally takes
protected birds, with reasonable regulation of those takes to ensure they
are compatible with the conservation purposes of the MBTA and the
treaties it implements. The Service took an initial step toward developing
just such a scheme in May 2015 by publishing the Incidental Take
Notice.279 Although the public comment period for the Incidental Take
Notice closed on July 27, 2015, to date the Service has not taken further
public action on the proposed rule. While the reasons behind this delay
undoubtedly include both the considerable resource challenges involved
in developing a programmatic environmental impact statement and the
deliberate pace at which most federal rulemaking processes occurs, one
also imagines that the current circuit split on the applicability of the
MBTA to incidental takes of migratory birds has played a significant role
in the Service’s apparent hesitancy in moving forward with the proposed
rulemaking. As several public comments on the Incidental Take Notice
pointed out,280 the Service may not have the legal authority to promulgate
a nationwide incidental take permitting scheme for industrial nondirected activities that take birds in light of Fifth Circuit’s holding in
Citgo Petroleum that the MBTA does not apply to incidental takes by
industrial actors,281 and the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Newton
278
279
280
281

16 U.S.C. § 704(a).
80 Fed. Reg. 30,032.
See Permits, supra note 141.
United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
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County and Seattle Audubon,282 respectively, that criminal liability under
the MBTA must be premised on activities directed at birds. The Service
likely has little interest in creating an incidental take permit rule that
cannot be implemented in nearly a third of the country. The proposed
congressional amendment to Section 703(a) clarifying that takes of
protected birds by industrial non-directed activities are covered by the
MBTA would resolve this issue by providing clear statutory authority,
and an express authorization from Congress to develop incidental take
permit program would provide the needed lubricant to kick start the
stalled process.
There is relatively recent precedent for the Service developing rules
exempting from MBTA liability certain incidental takes of birds at the
behest of Congress, albeit for a more limited purpose. In 2002, a federal
district court held that military live-fire training exercises by the U.S.
Navy on the island of Farallon de Medinilla in the Pacific Ocean that
unintentionally resulted in the death of protected birds was a violation of
the MBTA.283 In a subsequent ruling, the same court granted plaintiff’s
request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting such exercises on the
island that killed migratory birds.284 Congress’s response to this decision
was swift and decisive. Less than a year after the injunction was granted,
Congress included a provision in the 2003 National Defense
Authorization Act (“Authorization Act”) suspending the application of
the MBTA to incidental takes of migratory birds by military activities for
a period of one year to give the Secretary of the Interior sufficient time to
prescribe regulations using its authority under Section 704(a) of the
MBTA to exempt the military from MBTA liability for incidental takes
of protected birds by authorized military readiness activities.285
The Service finalized its rule exempting from MBTA liability
incidental takes of protected birds by military readiness activities on
March 30, 2007.286 In preparing the final rule, the Service considered
whether allowing for the incidental take of migratory birds by military
readiness activities would conflict with the United States’ substantive
obligations to conserve migratory birds under any of the treaties
implemented through the MBTA. The Service began its analysis by
282 Newton Cty. Wildlife Assoc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997); Seattle
Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
283 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 161, 174 (D.D.C. 2002).
284 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2002).
285 Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, Section 315
(Dec. 2, 2002).
286 Take of Migratory Birds by the Armed Forces, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,931 (Feb. 28, 2007), codified
at 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.3, 21.15 (2016) (“[T]he Armed Forces may take migratory birds incidental to
military readiness activities.”).
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noting that Congress made a clear determination of compatibility in the
Authorization Act by requiring it to promulgate the incidental take
regulations.287 It then went on to note that none of the treaties places an
absolute prohibition on the taking or killing of migratory birds, but rather
allow the signatory countries to authorize takings of migratory birds that
are not inconsistent with the conservational objectives of the treaties.288
The Service found that the final rule allowing incidental takes of
protected birds by military activities is consistent with the objectives of
the treaties because it is for a special purpose consistent with the purpose
of the treaties, it is limited to a defined category of activities that can
result in incidental takes of migratory birds, and it expressly requires the
regulated entity to develop and implement appropriate mitigation
measures to minimize any significant adverse impacts on migratory birds
from the activity.289 Further, the Service noted that the rule contains a
“safeguard” to ensure compliance with the treaties by specifying that it
retains authority to suspend or withdraw an incidental take authorization
if it believes that the specific activity at issue is incompatible with the
objectives of the treaties or does not receive adequate information from
the military to assure compliance.290
The development of the rule allowing for incidental takes of MBTAprotected birds by military activities based on an express congressional
authorization provides a useful template for the proposed incidental take
permit program for industrial non-directed activities.291 A clear legislative
mandate to develop the incidental take permitting program, coupled with
the suggested amendment to Section 703(a) clarifying that incidental
takes of migratory birds from industrial non-directed activities are within
the scope of the MBTA, is necessary to resolve the uncertainty about the
legality and scope of such a program created by the current circuit split
and to provide the Service with the impetus (and legislative “air cover”)
it needs to move forward with the process it started when it published the
Incidental Take Notice.
287 Id. at 8,933. See also HOLLAND & HART & INGAA FOUND., supra note 61, at 25 (noting
that Congress specifically found the incidental take authorization to be compatible with the
conservation purposes of the treaties, quoting the conferees statement in the Authorization Act’s
conference notes that they “believe this provision to be entirely consistent with the underlying terms
of all treaty obligations of the United States.”).
288 72 Fed. Reg. at 8,946.
289 Id.
290 Id. (“This rule will continue to ensure conservation of migratory birds as the authorization it
provides is dependent upon the Armed Forces conferring and cooperating with the Service to
develop and implement conservation measures to minimize or mitigate significant adverse effects
to migratory birds.”).
291 See Obrecht, supra note 54, at 137–38 (suggesting that the incidental take rule for military
activities could be used as a model for a broader incidental take permitting program).
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(3) Amend the MBTA to clarify that bird deaths from nonindustrial
non-directed activities are excluded from coverage under the Act. The
unsettled law around the MBTA also impacts nonindustrial actors who
incidentally kill birds by, for example, hitting them with their cars, and
must rely on the exercise of discretion by federal prosecutors lest their
trip to the grocery store result in criminal prosecution. While certainly
less fraught than the uneven application of MBTA liability for industrial
non-directed activities, it is ultimately no more satisfying, relying as it
does on case-by-case exercises of prosecutorial discretion rather than on
an articulated rationale for excluding these nonindustrial non-directed
activities from the MBTA’s strictures. At root, this difficulty stems from
the failure of the MBTA’s drafters to expressly exclude these types of
activities from the Act’s reach, despite the fact that it was apparent at the
time that neither they nor the drafters of the Canada Treaty intended to
criminalize them. This “original sin” has been compounded over the last
century by the legislative failure to amend the MBTA to clarify that
nonindustrial non-directed activities are not within the purview of the
Act.
One could fairly ask whether this is a case of a solution in search of a
problem given that there is no recorded instance of the Service or
Department of Justice prosecuting a noncommercial actor under the
MBTA for unintentionally taking a protected bird while driving a car,
owning a cat, living in a glassed house, or engaging in any other
“everyday” activity. This century-long practice of declining to bring
charges in these situations has effectively hardened the discretionary
exercise of prosecutors into something resembling a de facto categorical
exclusion for bird deaths incidentally resulting from nonindustrial nondirected activities. Some courts have argued that this pattern and practice
of declining to prosecute nonindustrial actors for incidentally taking
migratory birds in the course of their everyday, noncommercial activities
can be relied on to effectively ameliorate the “absurd results” that would
flow from a literal reading of Section 703(a), which does not explicitly
exclude incidental takes by nonindustrial non-directed activities from
liability under the MBTA.292 However, as one commentator recently
pointed out, this reliance on prosecutorial discretion to save an overly
broad law actually preserves the possibility, however small it may be, of
just such an absurd result occurring should a prosecutor decide to break
with tradition for political or other non-substantive reasons.293 It also
292 See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905 (stating that the decision whether to
prosecute a taking caused by a nonindustrial non-directed take of a bird is best left to “the sound
discretion of prosecutors and the courts.”).
293 See Caruselo, supra note 71, at 115.
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creates the possibility for inconsistent results and the appearance of
favoritism should enforcement actions be brought against one category
of violators but not another, with no comprehensible rationale for the
differing treatment.294 Further, and perhaps most practically, the Service
and the Department of Justice simply do not have anything close to the
resources it would require to bring prosecutions for even a percentage of
the hundreds of millions of takes of protected birds caused by
nonindustrial non-directed activities each year. Given this, any attempted
enforcement in this realm would necessarily be extremely selective,
likely piecemeal, and possibly improperly subjective. It is hard to
conceive of a legally defensible rationale for prosecuting one driver
whose car hits and kills a protected bird but not another.295
Finally, by continuing to rely on prosecutorial discretion and failing to
amend the MBTA to clarify that it does not apply to nonindustrial nondirected activities that kill birds, Congress has preserved a convenient
stalking horse for courts that would limit the Act’s application to only
directed activities undertaken by hunters and poachers. These courts, in a
neat bit of rhetorical sleight of hand, use the fact that most everyone
would agree that a person who unintentionally steps on a baby bird on
their way to work should not be criminally prosecuted under the MBTA
as evidence that the Act must only apply to acts directed at intentionally
killing birds. The Fifth Circuit employed this tactic in its Citgo decision:
If the MBTA prohibits all acts or omissions that “directly” kill birds,
where bird deaths are “foreseeable,” then all owners of big windows,
communication towers, wind turbines, solar energy farms, cars, cats, and
even church steeples may be found guilty of violating the MBTA. This
scope of strict criminal liability would enable the government to
prosecute at will and even capriciously (but for the minimal protection of
prosecutorial discretion) for harsh penalties: up to a $15,000 fine or six
months’ imprisonment (or both) can be imposed for each count of bird
“taking” or “killing.” Equally consequential and even more far-reaching
would be the societal impact if the government began exercising its
muscle to prevent “takings” and “killings” by regulating every activity
that proximately causes bird deaths. The absurd results that the
government’s interpretation would cause further bolsters our confidence

294 See Ogden, supra note 40, at 38 ([A]n enforcement policy that relies on prosecutorial
discretion without clear guidelines for its application . . . undermine[s] the credibility of both the
policy and the enforcement agency.”).
295 Id. at 40 (expressing concern that exercise of prosecutorial discretion may result in the
“under-enforcement” or “over-enforcement” of the MBTA).
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that Congress intended to incorporate the common-law definition of
‘take’ in the MBTA.296
Congress should abolish this stalking horse and eliminate the
possibility for absurd prosecutions of cat owners, car drivers, and
building dwellers under the MBTA by amending the MBTA to clarify
once and for all that incidental takes of protected birds from nonindustrial
non-directed activities do not give rise to criminal or civil liability under
the MBTA. There is an argument to be made that doing so would violate
the terms of the treaties implemented through the MBTA, which do not
explicitly exclude incidental takes from everyday noncommercial
activities from their lists of prohibited conduct. But both common sense
and the fact that, as in the United States, there are no recorded instances
of criminal prosecutions in Canada, Mexico, Japan, or Russia for takes of
this kind strongly suggest that all signatory countries view the incidental
taking of migratory birds by nonindustrial non-directed activities as
outside the reach of the treaties.
III. CONCLUSION
All laws begin as creatures of their time, inexorably bound up in and
informed by the prevailing societal, economic, and political views and
priorities of their day. At the turn of the 20th century, many Americans
were just beginning to recognize that the widely celebrated economic
gains made possible by the United States’ rapid industrial expansion
came with theretofore unacknowledged ecological losses, including the
disappearance of a bird, the passenger pigeon, which less than twenty
years earlier was defined by its ubiquity. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act
stands as an early example of a still maturing country’s attempt to find an
acceptable balance between the economic necessity of utilizing the
country’s bountiful natural resources to drive industrial growth, and the
moral imperative to protect those resources from total destruction.
Finding this balance is no less important today than it was in 1918, and
the MBTA still has an important role to play in preserving healthy and
diverse populations of migratory birds for this and future generations
without placing unnecessarily harsh restrictions on otherwise lawful
commercial and noncommercial activities. To do so most effectively,
however, the law must be amended to reflect the industrial, recreational,
and social realities of the 21st century. Without these changes, the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act will continue to be a law out of time.
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